From Blooming Judicial Philosophies to Castrated Legislation: Sexuality, Desire, and Nominations to the Supreme Court of the United States by McMahon, Adam Michael
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses
1-1-2011
From Blooming Judicial Philosophies to Castrated Legislation:
Sexuality, Desire, and Nominations to the Supreme Court of the
United States
Adam Michael McMahon
Portland State University
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of
PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
McMahon, Adam Michael, "From Blooming Judicial Philosophies to Castrated Legislation: Sexuality, Desire, and Nominations to the
Supreme Court of the United States" (2011). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 288.
10.15760/etd.288
 
 
From Blooming Judicial Philosophies to Castrated Legislation: Sexuality, Desire, and 
Nominations to the Supreme Court of the United States 
 
 
 
by 
Adam Michael McMahon 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
 
Master of Science 
in 
Political Science 
 
 
 
Thesis Committee: 
Christopher Shortell, Chair 
Richard Clucas 
Bruce Gilley 
 
 
 
Portland State University 
©2011 
 
 
 
i 
 
Abstract 
Society and institutions of government reinforce norms that constrain the behavior 
of individuals. Heteropatriarchal norms traditionally favor the perspective of white, male, 
heterosexual, reason, judicial restraint, and democratic authority over their binary, and 
minority, counterparts: black, female, homosexual, desire, judicial activism, and 
individual rights. According to the theory of Queer New Institutionalism, these 
dichotomous pairs are mutually dependent upon each other for definition and 
maintenance. The perpetuation of these binarisms is made through language, often 
assumed and unquestioned. However, the use of sexualized language and metaphors are 
identified in efforts to draw suspicion and consternation for these minoritized Others. 
When the presence of an Other is missing, those that would reinforce these norms being 
to skirt the line between the pairings, taking the position of the individual they would 
otherwise criticize. By utilizing critical discourse analysis, Supreme Court nomination 
hearings during the 109th and 111th Congresses were reviewed for support for the theory 
of Queer New Institutionalism. Senators and witnesses before the committee operated 
within the constraints of binary thinking and instances of sexualized and gendered 
language, as well as metaphors, were used to perpetuate these norms and link the 
nominees to the suspicion surrounding Others. 
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1. Introduction & Literature Review 
 If one were to pay attention to Supreme Court nomination hearings before the 
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, they would be inclined to notice that 
among the discussions regarding prior and potential cases, conversations about stare 
decisis, and emphasis on judicial qualifications, a large portion of the debate contains the 
underlying theme concerning judicial activism versus judicial restraint. On the one hand, 
activism is associated with all potential negative things that could come from a Supreme 
Court justice: overturning precedent, making decisions based on personal policy 
preferences, and ignoring the Constitution (Kagan 2010, Day 1, 446:00; U.S. Senate 
2009, 35). On the other, restraint represents the ideal position which it is hoped that all 
potential justices will anchor themselves: fidelity to the law, narrow decision-making, 
and respect for precedent and the Constitution (Kagan 2010, Day 1, 443:00; U.S. Senate 
2009, 59, 79; Wechsler 1959, 19).  
 This study will review the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominees 
during the 109th and 111th Congresses and examine language for support for 
institutionalized normative behavior. Instances of gendered and sexualized language, as 
well as the use of metaphors, will be identified to show the power Senators exert to 
reinforce expected and assumed norms on the part of nominees. Even though judicial 
activism/judicial restraint is the most prevalent binary pair exhibited throughout the 
nomination proceedings, a number of pairings exist and function to reinforce expected 
behaviors: male/female, white/black, heterosexual/homosexual, reason/desire, democratic 
authority/individual rights. These binary pairs are linked by underlying assumptions 
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regarding sexuality and desire (Burgess 1999, 203, 213). Identifying language during 
nomination hearings that maintains thinking within these dichotomous terms will show 
how normative behavior, and expectations of it, influence politics on a practical level.  
However, upon closer inspection, the relative incoherence of the term “judicial 
activism” eventually arises. It is applied to both conservative and liberal justices, from 
Democratic and Republican senators alike. This illustrates the predicament the debate 
encounters when it is limited by the construction of dichotomous terms judicial restraint 
and judicial activism. This pairing, or binarism, is one among many that constrains 
government and its institutions. It represents an asymmetrical power relationship, with 
each term mutually dependent on the other to define itself. The reinforcement of 
binarisms perpetuates the status quo, favoring traditional heteropatriarchal values (Butler 
1990, 3, 31, 39; Sedgwick 10-11; Burgess 1999, 202-207).  
Problem 
 The use of dichotomous pairs in characterizing the behavior of Supreme Court 
justices is constraining and obscures the debate, eliminating consideration of any 
alternatives that are outside of such binarisms (Burgess 1999, 201, 213; Gibson and 
Caldeira 2009, 143). Such categorizations assume that there is an objective approach to 
interpreting the United States Constitution, and judicial restraint is assumed to be the 
default position, dominant to its lesser alternative, judicial activism (Burgess 1999, 200-
201, 205). This is similar to arguments furthered by queer theorists, as well as feminists 
and critical race theorists, by examining and deconstructing a wide variety of 
relationships to understand their underlying assumptions and the power exchange 
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between the categorizations assumed to be natural (Burgess 1999, 201; Jagose 1996, 16-
18; Butler 1990, 3, 31, 46).  
 An examination of Supreme Court nomination hearings before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee utilizing the theory of Queer New Institutionalism allows for a 
critical examination of the heterosexist construction that serves as a basis for our social 
institutions (Jagose 1996, 17). It takes key elements from queer theory, arguing that the 
theoretical categorizations established and perpetuated in society, such as strict gender 
roles, are deficient and cease to function properly when practically applied (Burgess 
1999, 213). Likewise, a New Institutionalist perspective takes into account attitudes, 
norms, influences, etc., that might also influence what occurs in regards to the 
nomination hearings (Gillman & Clayton 1999, 4). Therefore, a Queer New 
Institutionalist perspective in analyzing recent Supreme Court nomination hearings will 
allow for a critical examination by deconstructing the conversation between senators and 
nominees. The underlying assumptions can be revealed, illuminating how they influence 
and impact the direction of the hearings.  
Questions 
 This study will attempt to answer the following research questions: 
What are the underlying sexual themes that permeate nomination hearings for judges and 
justices before the Senate Judiciary Committee? 
How are the heterosexist norms that are present in discussions regarding constitutional 
theory reinforced through nomination hearings? 
What is the effect of the persistence of institutionalized heterosexist norms? 
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 As queer theorists charge, theoretical categorizations of gender will ultimately 
break down when applied in practice. This is due to the inevitable arising of individuals 
that prove to be exceptions to the rule and cannot be easily classified by the strict 
constructions of male or female (among other dichotomous pairings) (Butler 1990, 39; 
Burgess 1999, 213). Likewise, following a Queer New Institutionalist perspective, one 
could hypothesize that categorizations into judicial activism versus judicial restraint 
would be faulty in practice, as individuals and situations could arise where the strict 
categories do not hold. Failings in practice might not preclude the influence that the 
theoretical categorizations have upon practical matters. Supreme Court nomination 
hearings are a prime environment for the debate regarding judicial activism versus 
restraint, and along with all the other constraining dichotomous pairings can be 
questioned and investigated.  
Heteropatriachal norms and the persistence of sexism 
 Society is constructed and reliant upon assumptions regarding how it is and 
should be ordered. The family serves as the basis for this, with heterosexual marriages 
constituting the bases for these units. They are traditionally dominated by men and are 
perpetuated through replication over time. Burgess argues that this arrangement is 
assumed to be natural, given, and universal (Burgess 1999, 203). It serves as the basis for 
society, the nation, and onwards.  
In an article titled “Sexism in Naming the World: Consciousness in a Patriarchal 
Iceberg,” authors Martel and Peterat (1984) argue that patriarchal structures of power are 
so preeminent in our world, that they are barely noticed. This is also reflected in 
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language, where men also maintain privilege. For example, words frequently used to 
describe women have negative connotations, such as chick, witch, bitch, etc. and are 
abundant in language (46-47). Their argument is that this acceptance of power structures 
and connotations assigned different roles for men and women reinforce a subtle 
legitimization of the existing power structures. Our language containing these sexist 
terms helps to enable patriarchal structures (Martel and Peterat 1984, 48).  
Martel and Peterat’s article convincingly makes the case that patriarchal 
assumptions in language dominate. Not only do they serve to reinforce the assumed 
subservient position of women, but those of blacks as well. Language connects persisting 
ideas about religion and myths with personal practices and beliefs: 
“Just like the slave who confesses to being ‘no good’ because she or he has learned to gauge 
personal worth according to the master’s (seldom mistress’) definition of a ‘good slave’, we use a 
language which constantly judges our second rate worth – or worthlessness.” (Martel and Peterat 
1984, 49) 
 
 The emergence of queer theory has given impetus for changing the questions 
asked in regards to gender and studies of sexuality. As McElhinny (2002) argues in her 
article, “Language, Sexuality and Political Economy,” instead of asking what gender 
differences exist between genders, focus should shift to answer what difference gender 
makes. She argues that the construction of society into dual roles, such as male and 
female, white and black, or even rational and irrational, are constructed in order to 
exclude other identities. These “Others” are seen as being unfavorable in the dominant 
conception of society, or even unimaginable (14). Similar to explanations given by queer 
new institutionalism, certain gendered behaviors become policies as revealed in 
McElhinny’s article. Language reflects beliefs, and these beliefs become actions that are 
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reinforced. The dominant forces in society reinforce the positions of white males, and 
they are associated by gender to be rational and objective. This is opposed to the 
irrational and subjective which is associated with the feminine, as McElhinny notes. In 
which case, the dichotomy between judicial restraint and activism, anything other than 
the traditional vision of the ideal judge, becomes associated with the identity of those 
officials that are female, black, LGBT, etc. It reinforces the excluded identities as Others 
(McElhinny 2002, 114). 
 The author describes heteronormativity, which is what has come to be expected 
from both genders. These values are analyzed to see how they impact LGBT persons, but 
the author rejects constraints based on these values. Instead, she calls for an 
understanding of sexuality that is stratified along a spectrum. The problem raised by 
McElhinny that needs further understanding is that “sexuality is still rarely understood as 
embedded in institutions and relations of inequality” (McElhinny 2002, 118-119). 
Moving towards a stratified understanding of sexuality, as well as gender, would work 
towards removing stereotypes regarding the roles of different individuals based on sex, 
gender, race, and sexual orientation. As the article notes, most people do not work in 
environments that are entirely welcoming and embracing of queer persons. For example, 
it is noted that women that assume occupations traditionally associated with men are 
often assumed to be lesbian. This label is still used as a pejorative term and is meant to 
insult (McElhinny 2002, 121-122). 
According to King (1991), men and women approach language in distinct ways, 
and the dominant theories as to why this is are the “difference approach,” where men and 
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women are believed to be from different subcultures, and the “dominance approach,” 
where men are believed to reinforce their role in our patriarchal society. This is reflected 
in conversations between men and women (King 1991, 2). 
Sexism exists if men and women are treated differently, if the treatment is less 
favorable to women, and if the basis for this treatment is attributed to gender. When it 
comes to sexist language, that which is associated with maleness is deemed normal, or 
there will be irrelevant reference to gender or physical appearance in domestic 
relationships. Sexism persists in how women are addressed, or if they are addressed at all 
–women are often ignored or objectified (King 1991, 3).  
Historically, strong women have been ascribed adjectives that have decidedly 
negative connotations that otherwise would not be used towards their male counterparts. 
Studies have shown that sexualized language also reinforced the subordinate role of 
women and embraces negative stereotypes. By one estimate, there are 220 sexualized 
terms for women and only 22 for men. Researchers ascribe this to patriarchal dominance 
in language, such as men being the ones who write the dictionary (King 1991, 22-23). 
Sexism and racism exist because of more than just language, but using language 
that reflects inequalities not only perpetuates existing differences in power, but reinforces 
existing social structures (King 1991, 72). Conversely, according to King, removing 
gender from all terms might suggest hypersensitivity (the book notes that a style guide in 
Canada says it would be unusual to replace the term “man eating tiger” with “person 
eating tiger”). The author instead argues for the usage of similar terminology regardless 
of sex in order to suggest the lack of sexist attitudes (King 1991, 76-78). 
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Queer theory and Queer New Institutionalism 
In order to understand the constraints formed by the application of 
heteropatriachal assumptions, one could start with Sedgwick’s Epistomology of the 
Closet (1990) and Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990), seminal works in the establishment of 
queer theory. The authors challenged the asymmetrical power balances that constituted 
relationships and served as the basis for the order of institutions and society. Segdwick 
argues that all of Western culture is based upon the structure of the hetero versus 
homosexual axiom. She attributes the instability of these constructions to the inherent 
paradox embedded within them. There is the minoritizing view, that homosexuals 
comprise a small subset within a gender, and the universalizing view, that sexuality exists 
on a spectrum and homosexuals operate as the transitive gender between male and 
female. These two views are mutually exclusive and invariably lead to conflict 
(Sedgwick 1990, 1-2).  
Defining homosexuality gave the term an identity, offset by what is perceived to 
be the more prevalent heterosexual. This created the power imbalance, where the 
heterosexual is assumed to be natural, but then begins to rely on the homosexual for 
definition. Without the homosexual, there is no heterosexual. The terms 
heterosexual/homosexual then cease to be associated with sex acts and , instead, being to 
comprise and entire identity defined by the terms (Sedgwick 1990, 10). According to 
Sedgwick, what is not said has just as much significance as what is said. She argues that 
which involves the closet can be especially revealing (Sedgwick 1990, 3). Her goal in 
pursuing a queer theory was not to wade into the essentialist versus constructivist debate 
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regarding homosexuality, but to open “the extent, construction, and meaning, and 
especially the history of any such theoretical continuity – not to mention its consequences 
for practical politics – must be open to every interrogation” (Sedgwick 1990,39). By 
challenging the unspoken, assumed, and inherent, especially in how they relate to the 
distribution of power, much can be revealed about how constraints of binarisms shape 
reality. 
In Gender Trouble (1990), Butler claims that individuals are formed and crafted 
in accordance with political and social structures in society (Butler 1990, 3). She argues 
that gender and sex should be distinct. These categories exists in what she calls a 
“prediscursive domain” and when you remove them from their binary structures, such as 
male versus female and masculine versus feminine, they become “free-floating” (Butler 
1990, 9-13). Understanding gender and sex in this way is important because it allows one 
to see femininity as defined as being the Other with masculinity being “synonymous with 
the ‘universal’” (Butler 1990, 25). 
 Butler states that the binary relationship between the two established sexes is 
regulated by grammar. It assures that nothing outside the dichotomous relationship can be 
sustained. The problem, she establishes, is that this construction is doomed to failure. 
Exceptions to the two established categories will inevitably arise. The construction of 
these sexes, deemed to be natural, will unravel in the face of an Other that challenges 
assumptions about the categorizations of gender and sex (Butler 1990, 26-46).  
Understanding the instability and conflict in attempting to categorize 
heterosexuality and homosexuality helps in approaching other dichotomous pairs. 
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Binarisms identified by queer theory, such as male/female, white/black, 
rational/irrational, reason/desire and even judicial restraint/judicial activism. The 
minoritizing versus universalizing (or transitivity and separatism) paradox involving the 
heterosexual/homosexual mirrors the conflict inherent in constitutional theory between 
so-called judicial restraint/judicial activism. 
Burgess (1999) argues that, in regards to constitutional theory, judicial restraint 
holds the dominant position. She argues that even though there is no objective approach 
as to how to interpret the constitution, judicial restraint has default legitimacy. Without 
an objective position to conduct judicial review, unelected judges are given the power 
and authority to invalidate what is enacted into law by democratically elected 
representatives. Therefore restraint becomes the dominant perspective because it accepts 
the preeminent role of “democratic authority.” This is in contrast to judicial activism, 
although also subjective, is seen as being “anti-democratic.” It represents a judge’s 
pursuit of their own political desires and the rejection of reason (Burgess 1999, 205).  
Burgess employs what she calls a Queer New Institutionalism, in order to 
challenge the assumptions regarding binarisms identified by queer theory. She links 
judicial restraint/activism, as well as a host of other binarisms, to underlying sexuality 
and desire that goes unquestioned in society. Burgess argues that it expressed by 
sexualized language within the debate of constitutional theory. Although it goes without 
notice, she cites several books containing terms frequently used and have a sexualized 
connotation. For example, Robert Bork’s The Tempting of America: The Political 
Seduction of the Law (1990) and Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and 
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American Decline (1996), and Carl Cohen’s Naked Racial Preference: The Case Against 
Affirmative Action (1995). She argues for a more critical analysis of the underlying sexual 
assumptions that serve as the unquestioned basis for much of the discussion between 
advocates of judicial restraint versus those favoring judicial activism in consideration of 
the U.S. Constitution (Burgess 1999, 207-208). 
A specific investigation by Burgess into Herbert Wechsler’s description of “naked 
power organs” in “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law” (1959) is employed 
to further link judicial restraint/judicial activism to sexuality and desire. In it, Wechsler 
appeals for a Supreme Court that “clothes” itself in “neutral principles” in being objective 
in ruling on the law. This is in contrast to judicial activism, which represents the pursuit 
of desired personal policy preferences. When justices allow the Court to be used in this 
way, they are acting as a “naked power organ.” This instance of explicitly sexualized 
language reveals his adherence to the confines of reinforced binarisms. An activist 
Supreme Court is one that pursues its desires and passions in trying to craft the law. It 
goes against reason. It is like a pervert who flashes his privates and has no shame, i.e. the 
homosexual. In his call for neutrality and objectivity in consideration of constitutional 
questions, Wechsler “outted” himself as being within the constraints of the dichotomous 
relationships that define our system: heterosexuality as opposed to homosexuality, male 
as opposed to female, and judicial restraint as opposed to judicial activism. His words 
defined his reality, and as Burgess explains, this reality helped define him as an 
individual (Burgess 1999, 210-213). 
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New Institutionalist approaches call for an understanding of how actors operate 
within and under the influence of institutions, as well as social and political factors. 
Research approaching judges from the New Institutional view consider the social context 
in which rulings are made, as well as the norms that courts must abide by so that their 
rulings are seen as being legitimate. They must be aware of outside factors if they expect 
their judicial opinions to have grounding, justification, to be accepted by the public at 
large. Therefore, New Institutionalist approaches are able to transcend the barrier 
between empirical analysis and the norms that constrain courts. They serve to describe 
these influences as well as critique their impact (Gillman and Clayton 1999, 2-5). 
 With similarities between queer theory and New Institutionalism, Burgess (1999) 
calls for using Queer New Institutionalism as a new approach in considering the 
Constitution. She argues that since there is no consensus on how to interpret the 
Constitution, problems will persist in consideration of constitutional theory. Calling for a 
New Queer Institutionalist approach, she offers a critique of how society reinforces 
“heterosexist constructions of sexuality” (Burgess 1999, 199-200). Burgess rejects the 
focus given on the preferences of choices made by judges as explained by rational choice 
theory. This shallow analysis fails to explain how judges come to decisions within the 
context of the society and institutions within which they operate. Conversely, she charges 
that New Institutionalism ignores heteronormative concepts that dominate our system of 
governance (Burgess 1999, 203).  
The role of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
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According to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the US Constitution states that the 
president is to appoint judges to the Supreme Court and other officers of government with 
the “advice and consent” of the Senate. The bulk of this work transpires in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, with the full Senate voting on to confirm the president’s 
recommendations after they are referred from the committee (Schuck 1975, 224).  
Congress decides on the number of courts and judges that exist and the number of 
nominations submitted for review by the Senate varies per session. Reviewing these 
nominations takes a significant portion of the committee’s time. The nominations of 
Supreme Court justices, circuit court of appeals judges, and district court judges are 
considered by the committee (Schuck 1975, 223). Investigations into Supreme Court 
nominees are highly visible (O’Brien 2009, 106). 
Gibson and Caldeira (2009) speculate that Americans form opinions about 
Supreme Court nominees based on two possible considerations: if the individual 
nominated has the qualifications and the experience to be a judge and if their ideology is 
within the mainstream. They suggest that partisan ideology might come into play if non-
partisan experience and qualifications are not clear (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 140). 
Debates regarding a nominees judicial qualifications, the following of stare decisis, or 
arguments based on policy and political ideology are often complicated by charges of 
“judicial activism” (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 143). 
The authors then claim that in order for a Supreme Court nominee to be 
successful, they must focus on their judicial qualifications instead of political themes, and 
such was the case of Samuel Alito. Those that support a nominee will emphasize the 
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judicial qualifications, while those opposed will focus on controversies derived from 
political and policy related perspectives (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 140, 144). If 
opposition to a nominee is to be successful, they have to focus on the political, policy, 
and ideological issues necessary to derail confirmation, however Gibson and Caldeira 
argue that this would be extremely difficult if there is even a modicum of support for the 
argument that the nominee is judiciously qualified to serve on the Court given the 
“reservoir of goodwill” that the Supreme Court maintains with the public (Gibson and 
Caldeira 2009, 153). 
Gibson and Caldeira believe that those that have preexisting institutional loyalty 
to the Supreme Court are more likely to evaluate a nominee to the Supreme Court based 
on their judicial qualifications compared to someone with less institutional loyalty, who 
would then be more likely to judge the nominee based on political considerations (Gibson 
and Caldeira 2009, 151). Their survey research found that frames are important in 
helping citizens to evaluate nominees based on criteria involving judiciousness, which is 
the necessary area of focus for the nominee and supports if they wish to secure 
confirmation (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 153). 
 The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for nominees serve as a forum where 
the discussion of judicial restraint versus activism persists. Judicial restraint is the 
dominant theme persistent in many nomination hearings and is often associated with 
originalists and strict constructionists. They acknowledge the persistence of this dialogue 
in viewing the Constitution from a position of judicial restraint, whether they be 
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originalists, strict constructionists, or textualists, are set in contrast to those that believe 
the Constitution is a living document (O’Brien 2009, 200). According to Justice Scalia,  
“It is only in recent years… that non-originalist exegesis has, so to speak, come 
out of the closet, and put itself forward overtly as an intellectually legitimate 
device… If constitutional interpretation could be adjusted as changing 
circumstances required, a broad initial interpretation would have been 
unnecessary.” (O’Brien 2009, 198-199) 
 
Scalia discusses originalism and contrasts it with what he calls “nonoriginalism.” 
He successfully frames the debate within terms of a dichotomous relationship. 
Originalism is a developed and visible interpretation that is contrasted by Scalia to all 
others. It thereby obscures other conceptions of the Constitution that might not fit within 
the confines of the spheres labeled “originalism” and “nonoriginalism.” Instead of being 
one among many ideas regarding the Constitution or perhaps one on a spectrum, it is 
presented as being one of two options: the right way versus everything else. Thus 
orignalists are able to own the concept of judicial restraint, while others can subsequently 
be characterized as judicial activists (O’Brien 2009, 200).  
Sager (2004) refutes originalism and challenges Americans to ask why 
constitutional practices should be dictated by those long deceased and judges appointed 
and removed from popular elections. He instead insists that the Constitution is under-
enforced. He uses provisions to provide for minimum welfare and to combat socially 
entrenched biases as two prominent examples to support his position. He argues that it is 
a good thing that they are under enforced by the Supreme Court, because they should be 
enforced by policy developed from popularly elected officials (Sager 2004, 3-7).  
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Sager makes an argument that the Constitution is least successful when it is the 
most restrictive, such as in the Seventh Amendment where juries are permitted for civil 
trials involving amounts over twenty dollars. Sager wants to know why some ideas, such 
as equal protection, are so broadly outlined by the Constitution, when the framers were 
evidently capable of being specific and particular in addressing certain aspects, such as in 
the Seventh Amendment (Sager 2004, 51-52). 
Sager states that the framers did not have the opportunity that we have today: the 
ability to draw upon the experiences of generations of people living under the 
Constitution and observe its practical impact. The Constitution was crafted, debated, and 
ratified, but this was for the text guaranteeing, for example, equal protection, and not how 
that specific text would apply to a specific situation 100 years in the future (Sager 2004, 
55-56). Sager categorizes constitutional practices into three categories: There is agency, 
which includes orignalism and reluctant judgment; partnership, including justice seeking 
approaches and democratarians; and guardianship approaches, which the author notes is 
not a viable approach thus far in American constitutionalism (Sager 2004, 16). 
To reinforce his position, Sager details how high profile originalists, such as 
Justice Scalia and failed Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork, stray from their 
constitutional philosophies. This is in spite of the perpetuating argument that underlies 
Supreme Court nomination hearings: the debate between judicial restraint and judicial 
activism, between originalists and those that believe in a Living Constitution (Sager 
2004, 58-59; O’Brien 2009, 207). 
Left with only two viable approaches to the constitution, Sager admits that,  
17 
 
“The reader may feel that I am forcing constitutional theory, and hence 
constitutional theorists, against an artificially sharp dichotomy between the 
agency model with its instruction-taking ideal and the partnership model with its 
collaborative ideal. It may appear that I have somehow lumbered reluctant 
judgment theory with conceptual entailments that it need not accept. But the point 
is this: Either we value the independent judgment of judges as collaborators in the 
constitutional project of identifying the fundamental demands of political justice 
or we do not.” (Sager 2004, 68-69) 
 
Even as a critic of originalism and despite his ability to set forth a number of approaches 
to constitutional theory in the United States, Sager is able to construe his argument within 
the confines of a binarism. Although he notes that this construction into two spheres is 
“artificial,” it is beside the point and he goes on to highlight what he finds more 
instructive to those approaching the debate. However, when one confronts the 
conversations forwarded in nomination hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
one finds that these dichotomous approaches to constitutional theory are utilized, 
artificial or not.  
A review of these interpretations regarding the Constitution shows that binarisms 
are effective in framing the debate. Reducing the debate to a choice between judicial 
restraint/judicial activism pushes out alternative conceptions, such as those identified by 
Sager. It allows justices, like Scalia, to cast his position within the mainstream of 
“restraint” and everything else that differs as “activist.” It demonstrates the effectiveness 
of these perpetuating normative constraints. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee and Supreme Court nomination hearings are not 
strangers to controversies surrounded gender, race, and sexuality. In 1991, Professor 
Anita Hill alleged that the nominee, Judge Clarence Thomas, has sexually harassed her 
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several years before. Professor Hill alleged that while she had worked as Judge Thomas’ 
subordinate in the 1980s at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he had 
sexually harassed her. These allegations, tantamount to a he-said she-said debate, were 
revealed just days before the committee was expected to vote on Thomas’ confirmation 
when a staffer leaked the allegations to the media (Ragan et al. 1996, xv-xvi, 133).  
During the Hill-Thomas controversy, it may not have been the intent of the 
senators to treat Hill unfairly or unjustly, but the dynamic and power relationships 
revealed in language studies of the hearings prove otherwise (Ragan et al. 1996, xx). The 
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee are not impartial judges, but rather elected 
officials that serve six year terms. They are held accountable by the electorate. As a 
member of the committee, they may take on the role of an impartial judge, a juror 
deciding which testimony to believe, or a political actor pushing a certain agenda. Which 
of these roles they assume, explicitly or implicitly, is the decision of the individual 
senator (Ragan et al. 1996, 6-7). 
Thomas, in now famous words, referred to his nomination hearing as a “high-tech 
lynching” and used the metaphor to illustrate the proceedings as being organized along 
racial lines, as opposed to Hill who did not evoke a similar metaphor while 
simultaneously defying stereotypes by being an educated, single, professional black 
female (Ragan et al. 1996, 53). Nevertheless, these words were a powerful from a black 
man facing a black female accuser before a panel of all white, male senators (Ragan et al. 
1996, 39). As Hill herself stated, “because I and my reality did not comport with what 
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they accepted as their reality, I and my reality had to be reconstructed by the Senate 
committee members with assistance from the press and others” (Ragan et al. 1996, 49). 
Ragan et al. (1996) utilize a number of diverse studies in order to examine the 
Hill-Thomas controversy in ways that were not necessarily within the realm of public 
perception when the hearings actually took place. Notably among them, one chapter 
focuses on how individual senators were able to use their roles as questioners on the 
committee to reconstruct Clarence Thomas’ image for the public. Before the accusations 
broke, Thomas’ team focused on selling his trustworthiness to the committee and tried to 
avoid emphasis on controversial issues. For example, he evaded questions concerning 
abortion. However, the authors argued that this led to suspicion regarding his 
trustworthiness (Ragan et al. 1996, 91). The sexualized language attributed to Thomas 
did not have to be proved or disproven, because of the political setting, his supports only 
had to deflect attention away from controversy and mold him within the confines of what 
was expected from a potential Supreme Court justice to mainstream Americans.  
From an intercultural examination of the Hill-Thomas hearings, one analysis from 
Ragan et al. (1996) attempts to show how outgroups versus ingroups set the stage for how 
the public viewed and interpreted the hearings. Hill was a woman and black standing 
before the senators who were all male and white (Ragan et al. 1996, 58). The idea of self 
is something that is socially constructed but evolved and constantly being refined. Most 
conceptions of the self revolve around dichotomous parings, such as public versus 
private, but also “while defying definition” (Ragan et al. 1996, 63). The Hill-Thomas 
hearings served as an example in the past where the Senate Judiciary Committee served 
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as an arena where identity was crafted, but the accused and the accuser, in order to win 
public support.  
After Anita Hill was forced to come forward with her claims of sexual 
harassment, it was the job of Republican senators to advocate on behalf of Thomas in 
order to repair his image to the public and save his nomination. Senator Specter 
reconstructed Hill’s narrative by repeating what she said and highlighting alleged 
inconsistencies. In his closing remarks he ignored her answers and reiterated her claims 
(Ragan et al. 1996, 50-51). Although the hearings were formatted in much the same way 
as a trial, they were not. Thomas was able to defend himself more effectively by speaking 
to the committee before his accuser addressed it. Senator Specter accused Hill of the 
crime of perjury through his line of questions directed at Thomas and inflecting his 
opinion to shift the criticism onto her (Ragan et al. 1996, 180-181). By defining Hill as 
the Other, a woman who defied heteronormative conceptions and was associated with 
activism, Thomas became associated with the dominant spheres: male, heterosexual, 
private, restrained, modest, etc. 
Republican senators utilized aggressive lines of questioning that were laced with 
subtle and overt challenges to the validity of Hill’s testimony. Ragan et al. found in an 
ethnomethodological analysis of the hearings that accusations and insults were 
incorporated into the Republican senator’s statements during the hearings in order to 
achieve these goals (Ragan et al. 1996, 32). Another study on impression management 
presented in the book found that senators tried to repair Thomas’ reputation by utilizing 
nonverbal communication. Emotions were intertwined in their statements in committee as 
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opposed to a focus on rational and logical arguments to refute Hill’s allegations. For 
example, the authors note that Senator Hatch used the raising of his voice at the end of 
lines of questioning to signal that he expected a “no” response to his inquiry (Ragan et al. 
1996, 101-104).  
 There were also studies on verbal and non-verbal deception, as well as 
believability, and audience evaluations of selected portions of the hearings. These studies 
all are effective in raising a number of questions regarding the believability of Thomas, 
the fairness of the hearings to handle the allegations brought forward by Hill, and how 
issues of identity and power may have been more important and were otherwise 
overlooked by the public during the televised committee proceedings. The hearings 
showed that narratives were constructed for Judge Thomas by senators advocating on his 
behalf. This is in contrast to Hill, who forwarded her narrative by herself without an 
advocate on the Senate Judiciary Committee (Ragan 1996, 155-157).  
Many of the senators that sat on the committee for the Hill-Thomas hearings 
remain in the Senate and were involved in the nominations of judges in the 110th and 
111th Congresses. Senator Specter was involved in the Hill-Thomas hearings and is 
known for furthering the narrative that Anita Hill was a “scorned woman” and suggested 
in his questioning that she made up the sexual harassment story in order to seek revenge 
for Clarence Thomas refusing her romantic advances (Ragan et al. 1996, 153). While 
subsequent nominations, such as those of future justices Alito, Roberts, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, did not involve allegations of sexual harassment, the presence of the same sitting 
senators gives cues as to where to expect language reinforcing heteronormative ideals. If 
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Hatch was capable of using leading lines of questioning and raise his voice to get the 
responses he wanted, he could do it again during more recent nomination hearings. If 
Specter was able to formulate alternative motivations regarding individuals, he could do 
it again.  
 Although Ragan et al. (1996) indicate a bias towards believing the testimony of 
Anita Hill, the study raises significant points about how power dynamics came into play 
in the hearings. A panel of all male, white senators served as political jurists in a debate 
where the interplay between sex, gender, race, and status all intersected. Despite 
illuminating the existence of power dynamics in the committee setting, the case study is 
limited due to the fact that is has been two decades since the events transpired. 
Discourse analysis 
Although modern research is predisposed to accepting the dominance of the 
white, male, middle class perspective, approaches dealing with power, language, and 
gender have an overlap with social constructionism: according to Alvesson and 
Sköldberg, they “avoid objectivistic assumptions and claims.” By utilizing discourse 
analysis, language can be examined to determine how reality is constructed and uncover 
the underlying assumptions at the core of society and social institutions. Reality is 
reproduced through the maintenance of norms within institutions. These norms are 
reinforced through the use of language. It enables the status quo and order to be 
maintained, and power is expressed through this construction (Alvesson and Sköldberg 
2009, 228-229). 
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Constructivist conceptions of discourse analysis attempt to understand how 
society perpetuates conceptions of power. A critical discursive analysis, applied in this 
study, seeks to understand the power dynamics that are perpetuated and their impact and 
consequences (Irving and English 2008, 108). There is not one distinct approach to 
discourse analysis, but several. There is no “right” answer in examining discourse, as 
there are multiple perspectives. However, the goal is to delve into the material in order to 
better understand the relational meaning that evolves throughout discourse (Gee 1999, 4-
5). Language is not neutral, and investigation will reveal the presence of ideologies. 
While the subjectivity of such approaches may seem “unprincipled and inconsequential,” 
the ability to understand more perspectives furthers debates (Widdowson 1998, 149). 
Uncovering power dynamics through discourse analysis means that, once seen, they 
cannot be unseen. And while Sedgwick argues that deconstructive analyses may not be 
enough to undo the constraints of binarisms, Burgess’ argument that the practical effects 
lead to unworkable application of such theoretical constraints gives one hope (Sedgwick 
1990, 10; Burgess 1999, 214). 
Discrepancies based on gender perpetuate sexism. Dominance, perspectives, and 
attitudes typically associated with men are favored and reproduced, leaving the 
experiences of women to be disregarded. A critical feminist approach to nomination 
hearings will allow a critique of existing conceptions and structures in which 
discrimination based on gender, or “gender blindness,” is exacerbated (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2009, 237). If societally established gender differences and constraints are 
based on discrimination inherent in the system, then they should be challenged and 
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questioned in light of more diverse nominees to the Supreme Court. The system was 
established by wealthy, white, men and was crafted with language that did not grant equal 
status to a majority of its citizens. Although the Constitution has evolved over time, 
inherent bias based on the perspectives of those who crafted the system can still be 
perpetuated. 
Discourse analysis follows post-structuralism, in that both approaches assume 
people to be inconsistent. There is a difference between language and external reality. 
The difference between the two is that discourse analysis is empirical and systematic as a 
research endeavor. All language is fair game: texts, speeches, documents, etc. It is also 
qualitative to solve the problem of emphasis on consistency and the occlusion of 
discrepancies. Qualitative research must avoid acknowledging multiple meanings and 
instead prefer a primary meaning. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) state that discourse 
analysis asks: “On what occasions are the different attitudes expressed? How are the 
utterances constructed? In what contexts are they included and what functions do they 
fulfill?” (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 229-232).  
The benefit of dealing with documents and texts, as opposed to interviews with 
subjects, is that there is no researcher influence upon that which is being studied. It is also 
useful because comparing the accounts given from the perspectives of different 
individuals allows the researcher to uncover the constructive meaning revealed by the 
conflicting views and statements (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 162). Reviewing a limited 
set of circumstances will help elaborate upon the experiences of individuals, such as 
women, which will limit over-generalizations (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 240). As 
25 
 
society changes over time, we should not expect previous women nominated to the court, 
such as O’Connor and Ginsburg, to have the same experience as Sotomayor and Kagan 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 103). By reviewing the most recent Supreme Court 
nomination hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the limits of confining 
debates of constitutional theory between categorizations between judicial restraint and 
judicial activism will hopefully be revealed in the face of more diverse nominees that do 
not fall within the construction of prevailing heterosexist norms.  
Reviewing a forum as highly salient to the public as Supreme Court nomination 
hearings will allow for the revelation of inconsistencies in the treatment of different 
nominees. The rigidity of previously identified dichotomous pairings in the face of 
increasingly diverse nominees will, if Queer New Institutionalism is correct, lead to the 
failure of the confining categorizations to adequate explain the judicial philosophies of 
the individuals that appear before the committee.  
As queer theory identifies the dichotomous relationships between heterosexual 
and homosexual spheres as well as others, such as white/black, male/female, Burgess 
focuses on what she calls the “central binarism of constitutional theory,” the ongoing 
debate over judicial restraint and judicial activism (Burgess 1999, 204). Echoing the 
sentiments of Sager (2004), she challenges Americans to ask why constitutional 
interpretation is decided by unelected individuals far removed from the democratic 
process (Sager 2004, 3).  Burgess goes one step further than Sager, and argues that judges 
interpret the Constitution without an objective standard. Lacking a consensus among the 
electorate in order to make rulings, she believes that it is not possible for judges to argue 
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that they make decisions objectively and absent from political influences (Burgess 1999, 
205-206).  
Burgess calls for judges that make decisions utilizing common conceptions of 
gender, race, and class. Often absent from these interpretations are critical analyses of the 
biased system favoring patriarchal dominance and heterosexist understandings. By 
highlighting examples in which scholars argue for a restrained interpretation of the 
constitution fashioned from an objective and neutral position while simultaneously 
utilizing sexualized language, Burgess convinces the reader to consider the implications 
of unchallenged assumptions about heteropreference and engendered patriarchal 
dominance (Burgess 1999; 206-208). 
 The Senate Judiciary Committee holds hearings for judicial nominees selected by 
the president where debates regarding constitutional theory are ongoing. Nominees are 
questioned to identify their views and assess if they are within the mainstream of the 
American populace. The problem, as confirmed by authorities on either side of the 
debate, is that interpretations of the Constitution are constructed as being discrete and 
oppositional. Queer New Institutionalism calls attention to the effects of this 
construction: perpetuation of the status quo, in which heteronormative and sexist 
preferences that are built within our system of governance are reinforced and perpetuated. 
 Each section will focus on the individual nominees before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. Chapter 2 focuses on the nominations of John Roberts and Samuel Alito 
during the 109th Congress. Chapter 3 focuses on the nominations of Sonia Sotomayor and 
Elena Kagan during the 111th Congress. The four hearings will be examined for the use 
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of words spoken by senators and witnesses before the committee to reinforce 
heteronormative expectations and behavior. Then, metaphors will be identified as well, in 
search of support for the theory of Queer New Institutionalism. Finally, the important 
binary pairs emphasized during each nominee’s confirmation hearing will be examined. 
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2. Methods and Judicial Nominations during the 109th United States Congress 
Following the theory of Queer New Institutionalism, there is no objective 
approach regarding how to interpret the United States Constitution. By highlighting 
dichotomous pairings, Burgess (1999) argues that sexualized language is used to 
reinforce institutionalized norms that perpetuate asymmetrical power structures. For 
example, majority spheres of influence are associated with that which is male, white, 
heterosexual, rational, and judicial restraint. But these dominant groups depend upon the 
existence of their counterparts, the Other, minority spheres comprised of female, 
black/non-white, homosexual, irrational/empathetic, and judicial activism (Burgess 1999, 
204-205).  
 Again, this study will answer the following research questions: 
What are the underlying sexual themes that permeate nomination hearings for judges and 
justices before the Senate Judiciary Committee? 
How are the heterosexist norms that are present in discussions regarding constitutional 
theory reinforced through nomination hearings? 
What is the effect of the persistence of institutionalized heterosexist norms? 
Following a social constructivist approach that incorporates perspectives derived from 
feminist and queer theories, among others, a form of discourse analysis was employed to 
review how senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee engage and vet nominees to the 
United States Supreme Court. Transcripts provided by the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
its website were reviewed, along with pre-recorded webcasts of Supreme Court 
nomination hearings provided on the committee’s and C-SPAN’s websites, in order to 
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identify the main issue areas highlighted by the senators as well as specific instances of 
metaphors and explicit language directed towards the nominees in order to reinforce 
institutionalized heterosexist norms.  
 The study relies on the assumptions already presented by the theory of Queer 
New Institutionalism: that unequal spheres of influence exist and that heterosexist norms 
have been institutionalized within power structures, namely the male, white, 
heterosexual, rational, and judicial restraint perspective dominates at the expense of 
subverting that which is associated with the female, black/non-white, homosexual, 
empathetic, and judicial activism. The dominant spheres therefore cause the perpetuation 
of similar perspectives and reproduce the existing power structures. Burgess identified 
instances of sexualized language used by legal scholars to reinforce these dichotomous 
pairings. Following a social constructivist perspective, it is assumed that language 
continues to reproduce the existence of these power structures in reality (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2009, 28). 
 With the theory of Queer New Institutionalism set as the basis for the study, 
individual cases can be examined in order to determine how they fit within the confines 
of the theory. Using this process of abduction, the theory can be further developed with 
the goal of being able to apply it to more cases than those previously identified. In 
contrast to induction and deduction, further testing of Queer New Institutionalism with 
empirical data will allow the theory to be modified and refined, thus expanding 
understanding (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 4). 
Setting 
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 The setting for the study is the Senate Judiciary Committee nomination hearings 
for the U.S. Supreme Court during the 109th and 111th Congresses, for the four most 
recently appointed Supreme Court justices. As a standing committee, it is charged with 
fulfilling the Senate’s duty in approving judicial nominations by the president. These 
hearings take place before the committee in the Hart Senate Office Building. Tradition 
allows the nominee to come before the committee in order to give testimony and answer 
questions from the members (Senate Judiciary Committee website 2011).  
Sample and Participants 
The Senate Judiciary Committee provides detailed records on its website for 
nominees to the courts. Available for the public to access are documents, written 
responses from nominees to questions from senators, background information, prior 
works provided by the nominees, as well as audio and visual records, including those of 
the nomination hearings themselves. Given the importance of Supreme Court 
nominations, the 18 Democrats and Republicans that comprise the committee are present 
to ask the potential justices questions. Only 17 Chief Justices and 112 associate justices 
have ever been selected to be on the Supreme Court (Senate Judiciary Committee website 
2011). 
 The difference in the political arena during the two Congresses allows for a type 
of natural experiment to be conducted. The nominees selected during the 109th Congress, 
John Roberts and Samuel Alito, were made by a Republican president, George W. Bush, 
and testified before the Senate while it was controlled by Republicans. During the 111th 
Congress, nominees Sotomayor and Kagan, were selected by a Democratic president, 
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Barack Obama, and testified before the Senate while controlled by Democrats. While 
there were changes in those that sat on the committee, many of the senators remain the 
same across all four nomination hearings. The primary difference is then that 109th 
Congress was presented with nominees selected by a Republican, the 111th by a 
Democrat. Also important, with the context of the theory of Queer New Institutionalism, 
is that the nominees made by President Bush, Roberts and Alito, were both white men, 
whereas those made by President Obama were female, Sotomayor, a Hispanic woman, 
and Kagan, a white woman (Senate Judiciary Committee website 2011). 
Measurements 
The framework outlined by Berger and Luckmann in The Social Construction of 
Reality (1966) serves as the basis for the deconstruction prescribed by Queer New 
Instititonalism. There is power in language, and words serve as basic units to be built into 
metaphors. These metaphors in turn are used to construct reality. Reality is then 
reproduced through generations in order to construct subsequent individuals (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966, 64-67; Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 28). Burgess’ argument for a 
Queer New Institutionalism relied on revealing the underlying heterosexist bias of the 
institutions in society. She was able to highlight these by looking for accepted ideas 
related to the law which utilized sexualized language. In her review of Wechsler’s 
“Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” she noted his use of the phrase 
“naked power organ” to describe the U.S. Supreme Court. Another example she mentions 
is the colloquialism “he got Borked,” with its sexual connotation, established after the 
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nomination of Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court failed to pass a vote in the Senate 
(Burgess 1999, 207-209).  
 These examples fit within the framework initially noted by Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) and serve as the basis for Burgess’ research. They remain a starting point in 
attempting to deconstruct the assumptions accepted as default and natural when 
considering aspects of the law, such as nominations before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee examined in this study. Taking the asymmetrically dichotomous pairings 
illustrated by Burgess, such as male versus female, white versus black, heterosexual 
versus homosexual, reason versus desire, judicial restraint versus judicial activism, etc, 
words, metaphors, and issue areas were sought that would fit within the construction of 
these binarisms. In Burgess’ example of Weschler’s text, the phrase “naked power organ” 
referencing the United States Supreme Court was effective in contrasting the majority 
spheres, the male, heterosexual, and reason, with the minority Others, such as female, 
homosexual, and desire. After this distinction is elucidated, Weschler then called for the 
application of “neutral principles” thereby “clothing” a Supreme Court which would 
otherwise be a “naked power organ.” By making this charge, Weschler completes the 
linkage ascribed by Queer New Institionalism: judicial restraint belongs in the majority 
spheres of the pairings. Judicial restraint represents the male, white, heterosexual, 
reasoned perspective. This relegates judicial activism to the female, black (or non-white), 
homosexual perspective, driven by desire (Burgess 1999, 208-210). 
 First, this study will attempt to identify the single words that serve to reinforce the 
dichotomous pairings previously outlined. Those that have sexual connotations or double 
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entendres serve to contrast binarisms as discussed. Second, phrases and metaphors are 
also located to distinguish between the spheres presented. If Berger and Luckmann’s 
(1966) theory regarding the legitimization of knowledge hold true, such instances 
function in constructing reality and subsequently reproducing it (Alvesson and Sköldberg 
2009, 28). 
 The nominations during the 111th Congress, the most recently completed 
Congress, saw the nomination and confirmation of two more women to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Given the previously outlined dichotomous pairings, Sotomayor and Kagan 
display several characteristics that represent the Other and maintain minority positions 
that threaten the pre-established and accepted social and institutional order. Alito and 
Roberts, nominated during the 109th Congress, were conservative, white men. They were 
both married, heterosexual (presumably), and had children. Both had served previously as 
federal judges (U.S. Senate 2005; U.S. Senate 2006). Sotomayor and Kagan, by 
comparison, were selected by a Democratic president and presumed to be liberal, both 
were single, career women without children. They mark the third and fourth women ever 
appointed to the Supreme Court. Sotomayor also had the distinction of being the first 
Hispanic nominee to the Court. Sotomayor had previously served as a federal judge. 
Kagan did not have experience as a judge, but served as dean of Harvard Law School and 
U.S. Solicitor General (U.S. Senate 2009; Marcus 2010).   
 Third, issue areas will be identified that reinforce the differences apparent in the 
nominees from what is required following the traditional and accepted majority: white, 
heterosexual males that adhere to judicial restraint in their approach to constitutional 
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theory (Burgess 1999, 203-204). These issue areas represent the main topics that Senators 
reference in their lines of questioning. Many are repeated and utilized in order to damage 
or derail the nominee’s credibility, reputation, and ability to interpret the law and 
Constitution within the mainstream of American public opinion (Gibson and Caldeira 
2009, 140).  
 As working women, if Queer New Institutionalism is correct, nominees 
Sotomayor and Kagan represent a threat to the preconceived notions of what a justice to 
the Supreme Court should look like. These are two individuals who focused on their 
careers and succeeded. They are unmarried and have no children. Sotomayor is the first 
Hispanic woman to be nominated to the Supreme Court. By remaining unmarried, both 
women challenge the assumption that the heteropatriachal family is the basic unit 
required by society in order for success (Burgess 1999, 201). Therefore, we would expect 
that words and metaphors used during the hearings will emphasize the Otherness of these 
nominees and subsequently, the issue areas considered by the Senators that subscribe to 
these biases favoring traditional constructions of society and institutions will relate to 
them as well (Burgess 1999, 205).  
Applying discourse analysis 
Following discourse analysis as outlined by Potter and Wetherell (1987), ten steps 
are taken towards a better understanding of the conversations approached: identifying 
research questions, selecting a sample, collecting records and documents, interviews, 
transcription, coding, analysis, validation, reporting, and application (Potter and 
Wetherell 1987, 160-174). Although interviewing is a key part of the process for the 
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authors, Gee (1999) states there is more than one way to approach discourse analysis, and 
the main task it to understand language in use (4-5). This allows for interviewers to be 
less rigid in conducting research with subjects. Instead of a formal survey which might 
rely significantly on yes/no or other structured responses, the authors argue that a less 
formal approach allows for responses which are more useful to the researcher in 
understanding the construction and function of discourse. What is important about this 
portion of their research design, as it is absent from a discourse analysis of Supreme 
Court nomination hearings, is that the researcher is forced to adapt due to the less rigid 
interaction. The researcher reacts and can respond to the interviewee’s responses with 
new questions. Thus, the researcher’s responses must be recorded and analyzed and not 
just the respondent’s. (Potter and Wetherell 1987 164-165). 
In a study that does not have interviewers, but still approaches language and the 
construction and function it serves within discourse, the researcher must also not be 
excluded from the analysis. The use of abduction in research allows for a single case to 
be investigated while interpreting it using an overarching pattern previously established 
by theory, Queer New Instititoinalism in this instance, which then explains the case in 
question. Although it shares similarities with both induction and deduction, it is not the 
same or simply a mix of the two. It adds new features: the investigation from the 
perspective of the theory leads to new insights and then allow for adjustment and 
refinement of the overarching theory going forward. Also, it incorporates understanding, 
allowing for reflexive research that incorporates and acknowledges the researcher 
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conducting the study and their relationship with the subjects engaged (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2009, 4). 
Unlike content analysis, discourse analysis allows for deeper understanding in 
analyzing language. Instead of simply counting instances in which certain words or 
phrases arise during the conversation, discourse analysis seeks to categorize the content 
into relevant areas (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 167). From this point, the documents are 
read in order to establish patterns and thereby determine the function and consequences 
of the language (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 168). 
The primary sources of data were transcripts and video from the proceedings. 
Pursuant to Burgess’ theory, instances of sexualized and gendered language that revealed 
the reinforcement of binarisms were identified (Burgess 1999, 207, 213). Specifically, the 
nomination hearings of the four justices were reviewed for sexual language that does 
serve the purpose of reinforcing constraints and then it was searched to identify similar 
language across the nomination hearings. This allows for further identification of power 
imbalance, as certain gendered/sexualized language may be attributed to one type of 
nominee over others (for example, directed towards women and not men).  
After identifying the presence of this language, it was examined within the 
context of the discourse to see how/if it reinforced common binarisms as identified by 
Burgess and Sedgwick (heterosexual/homosexual, male/female, white/black, 
reason/desire, judicial restraint/judicial activism, democratic authority/individual rights, 
etc. (Burgess 1999, 200, 217). Following Queer New Institutionalism, it is in these 
instances where incoherence of theoretical constraints based on dichotomous pairings 
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will reveal themselves as they are applied practically (Burgess 1999, 214). And according 
to Sedgwick, after this occurs and the presence of a minoritized Other is absent, those 
that previously reinforced the binarisms will being to transit the boundaries between the 
pairs (Sedgwick 1990, 124-125).  
The Nomination of John Roberts to the United States Supreme Court 
 In the summer of 2005, after the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 
President Bush nominated John Roberts, a U.S. Appellate Court judge, to replace him. 
Originally nominated to replace retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the passing of the 
chief justice prompted the president to elevate Roberts to the head role on the Supreme 
Court. It was the first Supreme Court nomination hearing in 11 years and only the 17th 
chief justice nomination in U.S. history (U.S. Senate 2005, 2, 4, 6, 7, 21).  
 Judge Roberts was nominated when the Senate, and thus the Judiciary Committee, 
was controlled by Republicans. The Senate Judiciary committee was comprised of 
Democratic members Patrick Leahy (who was later the chairman of the committee during 
the 111th Congress), Edward Kennedy, Joe Biden, Herbert Kohl, Dianne Feinstein, Russ 
Feingold, Charles Schumer, and Dick Durbin. The Republican majority on the committee 
was comprised of members Orrin Hatch, Charles Grassley, Jon Kyl, Mike DeWine, Jeff 
Sessions, Lindsey Graham, John Cornyn, Sam Brownback, Tom Coburn, with Arlen 
Specter as the chair of the committee (he later switched parties and was a Democrat 
during the 111th Congress) (U.S. Senate 2005, ii; U.S. Senate 2009, ii).  
 The nomination hearings before the committee took place on Capitol Hill on 
September 12th through the 15th, 2005 (Roberts 2005, iii). The setting for the nomination 
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hearings was during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which devastated New Orleans. 
Being the first nomination hearing in over a decade, a significant portion of time was 
spent by the senators probing Judge Roberts on the bounds of what he was willing to 
answer in his testimony. Reference was made at several points during the proceedings to 
the “Ginsburg Precedent,” her view that a nominee should give “no hints, no forecasts, no 
previews” during the committee hearings as to how they would rule on a case before the 
Court (Roberts 2005, 377). Although Roberts followed this rule, he was chastised by 
senators for not being more revealing. This was especially true for Senator Schumer, who 
charged that Roberts would “cite it when you don’t want to answer something” (Roberts 
2005, 260). This reveals the committees, as well as the nominee’s, challenge: to use the 
hearings to uncover as much as possible, but not so much that the future justice has 
prejudged all the cases that are to come before the Court or passed a litmus test. 
 At the beginning of the hearings, several Republican senators made reference to 
the Supreme Court being a “super-legislature” and justices acting as “super legislator[s]” 
citing the prevalence of 5-4 decisions from the Court as evidence that the body had 
become politicized. Chairman Specter told the committee that appointing a new Chief 
Justice would provide opportunity to “rebuild the image of the Court.” The repeated use 
of the same term, super-legislature, signifies a coordinated partisan effort in approaching 
the committee hearings, at least at the outset. Senators Specter, Grassley, Brownback, and 
Cornyn used their opening statements to frame the debate within the confines of the 
established binarisms of judicial restraint and activism: the Court has become politicized 
and was thus controlled by activists. It should not be a “super-legislature” and instead 
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must be returned to the status of a neutral arbiter, and by acting in concert, Judge 
Roberts’ supporters can make it their duty to do so (Roberts 2005, 2, 13, 41, 46). 
 Specter also made use of the terms “super-stare decisis” and “super precedents” 
to reinforce an ideological position he holds: that Roe v. Wade and a woman’s right to 
choose had been reinforced by the Court so many times, that it cannot and should not be 
overturned. After 38 cases which solidified the holding of Roe v. Wade, he wanted Justice 
Roberts to assure him that he would not be a vote against abortion rights (Roberts 2005, 
144-147). This is an example of language used to reinforce an ideological position which 
did not fall along party lines. Democrats questioned Roberts about abortion rights as well, 
but did not use the same terms as Specter. Republican Senator Hatch said “I am not sure a 
super-duper precedent exists” (Roberts 2005, 159). And Senator Brownback cites Plessy 
v. Ferguson as proof that super-stare decisis does not exist. Despite the Court reaffirming 
“separate but equal” in numerous cases, it was overturned (Roberts 2005, 289). This 
discussion among the Republican senators shows that some issues cross partisan lines, 
and while they might debate each other cordially, there is significant disagreement over 
the role of a justice in deciding on such matters. 
Questioning identity 
 Like the Supreme Court nominations during the 111th Congress, those during the 
109th Congress did not occur in a vacuum. The media reported on the President’s 
selection of Judge Roberts to be the new Chief Justice prior to the nomination hearings. 
And, like Kagan, questions arose regarding Robert’s sexuality. On August21, 2005, the 
New York Times published an article comparing Robert’s association with a nascent 
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conservative movement on campus at Harvard with the marginalized status of 
homosexuals. It ran with a picture of Roberts and two male friends (Scott 2005). 
 The article reinforced the point made by Sedgwick (1990), that homosexuality 
ceases to be merely a description of a sexual act between two persons of the same gender, 
and instead comes to refer to an identity, where the association of two persons based on 
factors other than sexual acts is come to be known as homosexual (45-47). It is implied 
by the article, possibly meant to fuel speculation in much the same way as the Wall Street 
Journal did by publishing the picture of Kagan playing softball, that Roberts is a 
homosexual, and a closeted one at that. As if three men pictured with a pie they made in 
the 80s and a quote comparing conservatives with queers has the ability to rewrite history 
in order to label some homosexual (Appendix A). Unlike the photo of Kagan, it did not 
appear to gain traction because Roberts eventually confirmed to heteropreferential norms: 
he is married man and has children. Questions of sexuality were central during Kagan’s 
nomination hearing, with repeated references to controversy surrounding Don’t Ask 
Don’t Tell and the Solomon Amendment. While questions regarding same-sex marriage 
arose during Roberts’ nomination hearing, they were not central (U.S. Senate 2005, 148-
149). 
Using words to reinforce binarisms 
 In a particularly telling exchange between Senator Cornyn and Roberts, the 
Senator describes the United States under the Articles of Confederation. He says that the 
federal government was “impotent” under such a document, and it led to the drafting of 
the current Constitution at convention. This was immediately after a discussion between 
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the two over neutral principles and the need to follow stare decisis (U.S. Senate 2005, 
270-271). 
 Cornyn uses sexualized language to frame the debate, defining the U.S. 
Constitution in a mutually dependent relationship with the Articles of Confederation. The 
binarism therefore invokes a reference to the penis: the federal government was incapable 
and ineffective under the “impotent” authority of the Articles of Confederation (U.S. 
Senate 2005, 271). The Articles had no enforcement power over the states, and by 
utilizing a sexualized term, Cornyn is able to associate the Articles with the feminine, 
homosexual, and non-white while reserving the Constitution with the masculine, 
heterosexual, and white. The federal government desired control over the states, but was 
emasculated and impotent under the Articles, unable to be effective and enforce power. 
The U.S. Constitution, replacing the articles, is strong and is master over the states. 
Having stamina and endurance, it has endured through time. And it is potent, adjudicating 
over effective, productive government (Burgess 1999, 204).  
 However, once again the inconsistency of the dichotomous pairing emphasized by 
the sexualized language is revealed when applied in practice. The Articles of 
Confederation were impotent, but to replace them a constitutional convention was held. It 
was an instance of activism: the drafting of a new governing document to replace the 
Articles. It was not through the reason afforded by the Articles that a more virile 
governing document evolved. It was through the desire to subject the states to the 
dominance of a stronger federal government and working outside the bounds of self-
imposed constraint that allowed for their replacement. Ironically, praise is given for the 
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endurance of the U.S. Constitution, but it was forged through a process which is abhorred 
by the most ardent of its supporters on the committee, such as Cornyn. By labeling the 
Articles of Confederation as impotent, he outs his desire for the Constitution, and his 
association with the homosexual by focusing on phallic terminology.  
Judicial restraint/judicial activism 
 The Republican committee members repeatedly and emphatically state that the 
Court should be an objective body, free from politicization. Multiple senators reinforce 
the dominant sphere of the judicial restraint/judicial activism binarism. Specter wants a 
Court of “consensus” (Roberts 2005, 2). Grassley praises Roberts as a replacement for 
Rehnquist, who exercised “judicial restraint” (Roberts 2005, 13). Kyl says that the 
Supreme Court is not a “political office,” thereby reinforcing the idea that the Supreme 
Court should follow neutral principles (Roberts 2005, 19). Sessions warns that activism is 
a judge ruling based on the desired outcome, to see policy preferences enacted (Roberts 
2005, 30). Brownback tells Roberts that the Founding Fathers wrote about restraint, and 
uses a baseball metaphor to reinforce his position: a judge is like an umpire and therefore 
cannot play on the field; a judge cannot rule in favor of their policy preferences. To do 
so, would further tear our country apart. He gets emotional as he notes the political 
division that plagues American society (Roberts 2005, 46-47). Over and over, at different 
times and citing different examples, the Republican committee members appealed for a 
justice who will adhere to the confines of judicial restraint.  
Returning to the idea of super-precedence, Brownback attacked the idea of 
repeated reinforcements of the holdings of a case as being irreversible. Roe v. Wade may 
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have been reinforced in 38 subsequent cases, but that does not necessarily make it the 
correct decision. Brownback cites the landmark Brown v. Board of Education case, which 
overturned Plessy v. Ferguson and found separate but equal to be unconstitutional as a 
seminal event in which the Court overturned existing precedent. He goes on to note “the 
Supreme Court has overruled itself in 174 cases” involving constitutional issues (Roberts 
2005, 47).  
After characterizing Roberts as a justice who will adhere to judicial restraint, and 
after Republican senators repeatedly and thoroughly praised and called for a replacement 
justice that would adhere to neutral principles, be an objective arbiter, and exercise 
restraint, Brownback in the absence of an Other representing judicial activism skirts the 
line between the dichotomous pairings of judicial restraint/activism (Sedgwick 1990, 
124-125). He then outs himself by appealing for the need of a justice to overturn Roe v. 
Wade for the benefit of the country. The constraints of the dichotomous pairings prove to 
be unworkable when applied to the practical issue of abortion. After subscribing to calls 
for restraint, objective application of the law, and judging based on neutral principles as 
his Republican peers do, the Senator allows himself to cross the line drawn between 
mutual dependent asymmetrical pairings: suddenly he favors desire instead of reason, 
activism instead of restraint. Of course, it is not that Senator Brownback suddenly 
changed his mind; it is just that the illogical incoherence of the binarisms were unable to 
be maintained when moved from the theoretical and applied to the practical (Burgess 
1999, 212-214).  
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Brownback’s statements allow the underlying and transitive sexuality that links 
the binarisms outlined by Queer New Institutionalism. The dominant spheres are male, 
white, heterosexual, utilize reason, exhibit judicial restraint, and apply neutral principles. 
But in stating his preferred policy preference to outlaw abortion, Brownback reveals his 
desire and appeals to emotions, decrying the exercise of “raw political power” that the 
Supreme Court exhibited in deciding Roe v. Wade. But by following the “neutral 
principle” of privacy as afforded by the Constitution, the result is that a woman’s right to 
choose was found to exist within the document and the result is that “40 million children 
have been aborted” and Brownback describes them as “innocent faces that bless our 
existence” (Roberts 2005, 47).  
He therefore rejects reason and the judicial restraint called for previously, and 
instead appeals to the minority spheres of the dichotomous pairings: judicial activism and 
a Supreme Court that is a naked power organ to act in overturning Roe v. Wade. He is 
then associated with those minorities, such as women, non-whites, homosexuals, which 
are oppressed, repressed, discriminated against, and ignored, in allowing his desire for a 
policy preference be exhibited. His testimony before the committee thus reveals the 
incoherence of the binarisms he and his fellow senators previously reinforced. The 
inherent contradiction thus revealed, the Supreme Court is labeled activist for ruling for 
privacy in Roe v. Wade, but this also necessitates an activist decision from the body to 
overturn such precedent. The closet door was opened during the Roberts confirmation 
hearing and the logical inconsistency of neutral principles/naked power organs, judicial 
restraint/judicial activism, reason/desire, etc revealed.  
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The Nomination of Samuel Alito to the United States Supreme Court 
In 2005, Judge Samuel Alito was nominated by President Bush to the Supreme 
Court to replace retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 139). 
Alito’s confirmation hearing took place a few months after Chief Justice Robert’s, on 
January 9th through the 11th, 2006 (U.S. Senate 2006, iii).  
 Although Alito was generally praised for his candor in answering questions, there 
were also several issues raised repeatedly in attempts to challenge his nomination (U.S 
Senate 2006, 516, 559, 574). One such issue was Alito’s failure to recuse himself from 
the Vanguard case in 2002, where he decided in a case for a company with which he held 
a mutual fund (U.S. Senate 2006, 32, 388). Another was Doe v. Groody, a case where 
Alito ruled in favor of police who stripped searched a 10 year old girl after executing a 
warrant against a suspected drug dealer (U.S. Senate 2006, 331). These issues were used 
to paint Alito as being of questionable ethics by failing to recuse himself as well as 
predisposed to ruling in favor of the government.  
Using words to reinforce binarisms 
Reinforcing binarisms could not have been done more succinctly than when 
Senator Specter used the term “flaming liberal” in contrast to an “arch-conservative” 
during Alito’s nomination hearing. He stated that, by examining the right set of cases, 
Judge Alito could be described as either. By contrasting the pairings and noting that Alito 
could be construed within in the confines of either, he is simultaneously identifying and 
outlining binarisms, while rejecting their flaws (Alito 2006, 3). 
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Flaming liberal thus encapsulates several minority spheres in one term. The word 
flaming is normally associated with a homosexual, typically an effete one that is unable 
to conceal his sexual orientation, and in this instance is used to describe a liberal. By 
pairing the two words, it denotes judicial activism as well as desire, by characterizing 
someone as desiring certain progressive policy outcomes. The combination of these 
minoritized terms, female, homosexual, desire, and judicial activism, therefore signals a 
threat to their valorized counterparts: male, heterosexual, reason, and judicial restraint. 
By connecting these minoritized Others, the flaming liberal is elevated to a significant 
threat over the arch conservative. By defying predetermined heteropreferential norms, it 
is a challenge to their political values as well as their sexuality (Valenti 2008, 94-96; 
Burgess 1999, 204).  
However, Specter quickly dismantles this dichotomous pairing by noting the ease 
in their construction. By selectively assembling cases from Alito’s history as a judge, a 
narrative can be crafted to make either association. So while he appeals to stereotypical 
conceptions of identity in his willingness to use the terms, Specter also breaks them apart 
by showing the futility in applying them to Judge Alito.  
Judicial restraint/judicial activism 
 Similar to what occurred during Robert’s confirmation hearing, senators on the 
committee spent a significant amount of time reinforcing the judicial restraint/judicial 
activism binarism. Perhaps this is to be expected, given the proximity in time between 
Alito and Roberts’ nomination hearings. The binarisms built up over time were again 
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proven unworkable by Senator Brownback’s emotional appeal to overturn precedent, and 
then joined by Senator DeWine (U.S. Senate 2006, 46-47, 390-391). 
White/black 
 In several instances during Alito’s nomination hearing, a debate arose over the 
significance of race. Senator Durbin raises the question of race in reference to the Riley v. 
Taylor case, in which the need for removing African Americans on the jury was 
discussed. Durbin noted that Alito compared the significance of an all-white jury “as 
relevant as the fact that five of the past six Presidents of the United States have been left-
handed” (U.S. Senate 2006, 457). While Durbin is asking Alito to acknowledge the 
disparity and power asymmetry associated with white and non-white identities, Alito’s 
comments appear to indicate a disregard for race.  
 By appealing to the power imbalance between racial identification, Durbin wants 
Alito to acknowledge the possibility of discrimination based on race. While Durbin does 
not invoke sexualized language during this discussion to emphasize his point, it is a 
discussion of the white/black binarism and shows Alito operating within it based on prior 
comments. The dominant position of whites in society affords them the ability to look at 
the world without consideration for race. Although being white is being a part of a race, 
that dominant position allows members of the dominant group to assume their position as 
being natural (Wing 1997, 45). 
 Durbin’s emphasis on Alito commenting about the insignificance of all-white 
juries in deciding a case against a non-white person is his appeal for Alito to reject 
binarisms of white/black. He wants the judge to view the world from the perspective of a 
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person who does take race into account. This is because the non-white individual knows 
that others are able to perceive his race in association with others of the minority sphere.  
 Senator Kyl again invokes the image of lady justice, describing her as blind with 
the scales of justice. He uses her to illustrate how we place trust in our system. 
Individuals put their freedom and fate into the hands of judges (U.S. Senate 2006, 515). 
But while judges do not want to cast decisions based on a person’s identity, Durbin’s 
question illustrates the point, without evoking imagery, about the problems that could 
arise when judges fail to acknowledge discrimination on the part of other members of 
society.  
Democratic authority/individual rights 
 Another persistent theme during Alito’s nomination hearing was the claim from 
his opponents that he would be a consistent vote on the Court in favor of the government 
and against individual rights. The judge’s ruling in Doe v. Groody illustrates this threat 
and was mentioned repeatedly by senators and witnesses before the committee. In that 
case, police were issued a warrant to search a man for drugs. It was believed that he hid 
drugs on other people within the same premises, so a 10 year old girl was stripped search 
and Alito ruled that that was permissible (U.S. Senate 2006, 635). Opponents used this 
case to assert that Alito continually gives undue deference to law enforcement and 
government authorities.  
 Senators were concerned with this given the context of the hearings, in which the 
President was pushing to extend the limits of executive power in the War on Terrorism. 
Alito’s belief in the Unitary Executive Theory was cited by Senator Schumer, one of his 
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most vocal opponents on the committee, as reason for concern. Schumer said that Alito’s 
“deferential and absolutist” view of the separation of powers between the three branches 
of government were concerning, citing his willingness to allow the president to execute 
warrantless wiretaps and expand his authority under inherent powers of the Constitution 
(U.S. Senate 2006, 37-38). 
 Witnesses before the committee warned that Alito would pose a threat to 
individual rights as well. Predictably, witnesses in favor of civil rights and a woman’s 
right to choose were opposed to Alito as a conservative jurist. Fred Gray, a civil rights 
attorney, and Kate Michelman, the former president of NARAL Pro-Choice, argue 
against his nomination for those reasons (U.S. Senate 2006, 728-733). Berkeley law 
professor Goodwin Liu, also argued against Alito’s nomination, arguing that although he 
is not an ideologue, his opinions consistently favor the government and impinge on 
individual liberties (U.S. Senate 2006, 690-692).  
 This attempt to place Alito within the confines of the democratic 
authority/individual rights binarism, as if there has to be a choice between one or the 
other, also results in him being removed or in conflict with the pairing of judicial 
restraint/judicial activism. If Alito would give deference to and respect the inherent 
powers of the president under the Constitution should be approved for the Supreme 
Court, he cannot be coherently argued to be a strict constructionist and a loyal adherent to 
judicial restraint. An interpretation of the Constitution that seeks to expand the powers of 
the presidency absent an amendment to the document is squarely within the judicial 
activist sphere as opposed to the dominant sphere of judicial restraint. Ronald Sullivan, a 
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Yale law professor, argues this point, saying that Alito is not always a strict 
constructionist and “shifts his interpretive style when necessary to rule in accord with the 
government’s interests” (U.S. Senate 2006, 635). 
 An analysis of the discourse during the nomination hearings of Roberts and Alito 
during the 109th Congress might be expected to reveal little sexualized language and few 
binary constraints. However, this was shown not to be the case. Judge Roberts and his 
supporters in the Senate actively cast him as adhering to judicial restraint by using 
“neutral principles” (U.S. Senate 2005, 269-270, 411) and being a “neutral arbiter” (U.S. 
Senate 2005, 544). The media, if only briefly, attempted to incite suspicion that Judge 
Roberts might be a homosexual, or at least attempted to link him to that suspicion by 
characterizing conservatives at Harvard as being a minoritized Other (Scott 2005). 
Sexualized language was used during Roberts’ nomination hearing, with Cornyn 
describing the federal government under the Articles of Confederation as being 
“impotent” and thereby elevating the power of the Constitution within the confines of a 
binarism of his own creation (U.S. Senate 2005, 271).  
During the Alito nomination hearing, opponents to the president’s selection to 
replace retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor attempted to depict him as being out of the 
mainstream and too conservative to replace her on the Court. To illustrate the point, 
senators and witnesses alike tried to define Alito within the confines of a democratic 
authority/individual rights, saying that he shows deference and inherent belief in a 
powerful executive and therefore would upset the separation of powers and checks and 
balances between the branches of government. There was also instance of sexualized 
51 
 
language as Senator Specter used it in drawing attention to the contrasting pairs of a 
flaming liberal/arch conservative. However, this was done to refute a binarism in 
attempting to define Alito within a construct that lacked nuance and was incoherent (U.S. 
Senate 2005, 3).  
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3. Supreme Court Nominations during the 111th United States Congress 
 
Democrats, now controlling the Senate, also controlled the Judiciary Committee. 
Senator Leahy, formerly ranking member during the 109th Congress, became the Chair. 
Former Chairman Specter switched parties and relinquished control of the committee, but 
remained on it as a Democrat. During the 109th Congress, there were 10 Republicans and 
8 Democrats; for the 111th there were 12 Democrats and 7 Republicans. This included 
the addition of Democratic Senators Cardin, Whitehouse, Kaufman, and Franken, as well 
as a second woman, Klobuchar. Senator Biden had become Vice President, and Senator 
Kennedy had passed away. Republican Senators Sessions, Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, Graham, 
Cornyn, and Coburn remained on the committee for the 111th Congress, while Dewine 
and Brownback did not. The Supreme Court nominees to be presented before the 
committee during the 111th Congress include Judge Sonia Sotomayor and Solicitor 
General Elena Kagan (U.S. Senate 2009, 1). 
The Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court 
 Judge Sonia Sotomayor was nominated to be an associate justice to the Supreme 
Court by President Barack Obama in 2009 to replace retiring Justice Souter. She came to 
the committee with 17 years of prior judicial experience. She was also the first Hispanic 
nominated to the Supreme Court. Her nomination hearing took place during the summer 
of 2009 before the 19 members of the Senate Judiciary Committee in the Hart Senate 
Office Building. The nominations proceeded with members asking questions and 
discussing her background and qualifications in order of rank for several rounds (U.S. 
Senate 2009, 1, 3, 5, 21). 
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 Many issues were covered during the week of hearings. The nominee was shown 
deference afforded her position as an experienced judge, with senators, Democrats and 
Republicans alike, referring to her as “Judge Sotomayor” or simply “Judge.” Topics 
typical of Supreme Court nomination hearings included discussions surround the Second 
Amendment and abortion (U.S. Senate 2009, 20), to less controversial issues such as 
allowing TV cameras to record Supreme Court proceedings (U.S. Senate 2009, 51). 
 Specific to the nominee were several discussions regarding Ricci v. DeStefano, a 
case in which she ruled as a federal judge, a dispute involving firefighters in New Haven, 
Connecticut and a test used for determining promotions and the use of race. As argued by 
Chairman Leahy, Sotomayor followed precedent and ruled unanimously as part of a three 
judge panel to defer to the lower District court’s decision. By doing so, Sotomayor 
allowed for critics to charge that she was an “activist,” “racist,” and “biased,” even 
though Leahy used his time during the nomination hearings to argue the contrary, that she 
was following established precedent in deciding the case, which was ultimately 
overturned by the Supreme Court (U.S. Senate 2009, 64-65).  
Using words to reinforce binarisms 
 Also specific to the nomination of Sotomayor is criticism from the senators over 
remarks she gave during a speech, stating that a “wise Latina” would come to a better 
decision than others (U.S. Senate 2009, 7). Republican senators pounced on these 
comments, which were also highlighted in major U.S. newspapers (Markon 2009; Nixon 
2009; Savage 2009). They use this to further charges that Sotomayor would use gender or 
ethnicity in coming to judicial decisions (U.S. Senate 2009, 18, 22-23, 26-27). 
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 Americans paying attention to the nomination hearings might be confused by 
senators highlighting the importance and historic nature of the first Hispanic woman 
nominated to the Supreme Court. The praise was accompanied by comments refuting the 
importance of identity and background used to influence a judge’s consideration of a case 
and approach to the law. There is simultaneous support for the nomination of a diverse 
nominee along with criticism of Sotomayor’s acknowledgement of the influence of her 
ethnicity and gender. This reflects a shallow reading of the impact and significance such 
characteristics play in the lives of Americans that comprise minority groups.  
 Such perspectives seek to simultaneously acknowledge and dismiss the 
importance of identity and reinforce the existing and enduring asymmetrical power 
inequalities of America’s social institutions. This is a heterosexist perspective that 
continues to place importance on the views of those that constructed our system of 
governance: rich, white, males who enshrined discrimination into the Constitution. The 
tradition of considering racially inferior African Americans as well as depriving women 
of political and individual rights is a perspective that can easily order others to disregard 
considerations of race or gender in decision-making.  
Analogies are often invoked in order to place people in the situation of others. It is 
an attempt to see the world from the perspective of someone unlike oneself. However, 
such exercises are limited because individuals are unable to remove the lense through 
which they view the world to completely experience what it is like to look through the 
lense of someone else. One who identifies with a particular group cannot escape looking 
at the world from behind that identity (Wing 1997, 44-45). For example, white people 
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look at the world through the context of being white and even though it is a race, they do 
not see the world through a racial lense because of the dominant position of whites in 
society (Wing 1997, 45). Therefore, a system constructed from the dominant position is 
unable to allow for those belonging to the dominant group to completely understand how 
being subjugated, in practice and through tradition, perpetuates through the use of 
language or continued actions and behaviors that seek to require minorities to ignore the 
significance of their status within those groups. 
Adding to discussions of groups in America, minorities and women are placed in 
dichotomous pairings that ignore other subsets. Therefore individuals who belong within 
multiple minority groups, such as black women or Hispanic women, are further isolated 
(Wing 1997, 306; Crewnshaw 2000, 210-214). Justice Sotomayor, as a Hispanic woman, 
belongs to two outgroups. This could allow her a perspective critical of the prevailing 
heterosexist conceptions of society where a “neutral” position is synonymous with the 
white, male perspective.  
In discussing these Wise Latina remarks made by Judge Sotomayor, Republican 
Senator Graham indicates his concerns with the comments. He notes that, "If I had said 
anything remotely like that, my career would have been over” (U.S. Senate 2009, 27). 
This once again appeals to the heteronormative standard of ignoring race, gender, and the 
traditional and persistently dominant role white men have played in the construction and 
maintenance of our social institutions. For a white male to ask an individual who is of 
multiple outgroups, in this case Hispanic women, to be blind to identity is to accept de 
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facto legitimacy of the prevailing view maintained by the dominant ingroup, white men 
(Burgess 1999, 202-203).  
Therefore, ignoring identity is not necessarily synonymous with equality and 
acceptance of all individuals regardless of their demographics. It is instead an appeal to 
the status quo by an appeal for “gender blindness,” where in this case ignoring gender 
delivers default legitimacy to the patriarchal conceptions of society (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2009, 237). By calling for judges that ignore race and gender, Graham is 
appealing to “universal rationality” that does not discriminate, but while ignoring 
identity, reinforces already institutionalized versions of discrimination where gender 
restraints are already functioning (Butler 1990, 12). 
Graham proceeds to muse about his responsibility as a member of the committee: 
“If I give you this robe to put you on the Supreme Court…” He embarks upon the same 
line of thinking as Weschler as identified by Burgess. In speaking in terms of 
clothed/unclothed, he couples restraint with reason, and being unclothed/naked with 
activism and desire (Burgess 1999, 208,213). He states that Sotomayor’s comments, 
including the Wise Latina speech, allow him a view of how she behaves “outside the 
courtroom without the robe” (U.S. Senate 2009, 27-28). In other words, outside of the 
courtroom, Sotomayor is free to act in ways that might not be acceptable for a Supreme 
Court justice. This is similar to the view expressed by Wechsler as deconstructed by 
Burgess. While more explicit and utilizing a more abstract metaphor, Wechsler described 
the Supreme Court clothed in “neutrality” as in opposition to one that operates as a 
“naked power organ” (Wechsler 1959, 12, 19). Burgess describes his article, which 
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utilizes sexualized language, to embrace the binarism that underlies his argument, that the 
debate is a choice between judicial restraint and judicial activism or reason and desire. A 
Supreme Court that is clothed in neutrality is therefore seen as legitimate within this 
construction, by making use of logic and restraint, as opposed to the perverse nature of an 
unchanged and impassioned judiciary, one which is activist and driven by desire to reach 
decisions (Burgess 1999, 208).  
This is similar to the imagery invoked by Graham. Sotomayor, without the 
restraint of her “robe” is free to reveal her true self when she makes appearances in 
public. Sotomayor, in delivering her Wise Latina speech, effectively “takes the robe off 
and says that their experience makes them better than someone else,” according to 
Graham (U.S. Senate 2009, 27). He discloses that he must decide whether or not to allow 
her access to the robe of a Supreme Court justice. He happens to have power as a senator 
(and a man) to decide if she (a woman) will be appointed to the Supreme Court (to a 
position that has been traditionally closed off to women). If he deems that she conforms 
to his expectations, he will give her the robe. He must decide if he can “clothe” her 
perceived judicial activism. By appointing her to the highest court in the land, Graham 
uses the robe figuratively to express his desire for her to be judicially restrained, but fears 
openly that she will continue to act nakedly, pursuing her passions and desires as an 
activist without restraint. Ironically, he must eschew her legal record in order to express 
his desire, for her to conform to his preferences and not act on hers. 
Sotomayor’s “fidelity” to the law is challenged throughout the hearings. This is 
despite her firm commitment and explicit comments to the contrary, 
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"In the past month, many Senators have asked me about my judicial 
philosophy. Simple: fidelity to the law. The task of a judge is 
not to make law, it is to apply the law" (U.S. Senate 2009, 59). 
Despite this assurance, backed up by her record as a judge, Sotomayor is challenged by 
Republican senators who believe that her previous comments in speeches that recognize 
identity are a threat to a restrained interpretation of the Constitution. Senator Cornyn, a 
Republican from Texas, describes his difficulty in reconciling her fidelity to the law as 
well as her past statements which recognize identity, 
“I am struggling a little bit to understand how your statement about physiological 
differences could affect the outcome or affect judging and your stated 
commitment to fidelity to the law as being your sole standard and how any litigant 
can know where that will end” (U.S. Senate 2009, 330). 
 
The repeated use of the word “fidelity” in Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing 
should initiate debate on how it perpetuates heterosexist constructions within 
government, instead of just its use to indicate oppositional choice between the U.S. 
Constitution and the recognition of identity. First, it invokes a continued heterosexist 
conception of the Constitution and U.S. law because it appeals to already established 
patriarchal and heterosexual norms: that a woman should be married to a man, who is the 
head of a family unit (Burgess 1999, 203-204).  
Within this conception, the U.S. Constitution is the authority to which one is to 
submit, much like the man is for the family, as husband and father he is the leader of the 
household and the authority to which members obey. The expectation is that a good wife 
will submit to her husband and remain loyal to him, and that this fidelity to him is to be 
rewarded, whereas disloyalty –cheating on her husband and infidelity – is to be shunned 
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by society and threatens the family. In the same way, Sotomayor, as a woman, must 
submit to the Constitution and remain loyal to it, rejecting anything that strays from its 
authority which would also threaten pre-established heterosexual, patriarchal norms. 
Feminists also critique the idea that men should demand that women claim 
fidelity to the U.S. Constitution. Catherine MacKinnon (2005) addresses this directly. 
She argues that it is a document which was crafted without her consent or the consent of 
women. She believes a moralizing view of the Constitution is one that sees it from the 
top-down in deciding what is good and bad, but that instead it should be crafted from the 
bottom-up, from the practical to the theoretical. In so doing it would reconcile how the 
Constitution permits the perpetuation of inequality, regardless of some principled 
approach to calling certain practices good or bad.  
MacKinnon believes that fidelity works both ways, and that in order for her to be 
loyal to it, it must also be loyal to women. For example, she notes that the Constitution 
would be made more legitimate in the eyes of women were it to include an Equal Rights 
Amendment, so that when it did, women would see it as being more legitimate than 
compared with how it is now (MacKinnon 2005, 66-67, 70). The feminist perspective 
allows for a critique of the demands for “fidelity” to the Constitution, which suggests 
acquiescence to the heteronormative ideal. It demands that women, even as justices, act 
according to established cultural norms which serve as the basis for institutions like the 
Supreme Court. Simultaneously, putting nominees on the spot and refuting them en 
masse, as Republicans criticize Sotomayor for her Wise Latina remarks, ensures that 
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alternative interpretations are downplayed or refuted before justices make it onto the 
bench.  
The nomination of Sotomayor to the Supreme Court followed the prediction of 
Gibson and Caldeira (2009), where those that support a nominee attempt to emphasize 
their “judiciousness” and the opponents to the nominee stress that they are biased or out 
of the ideological mainstream compared to the rest of Americans (Gibson and Caldeira 
2009, 140). In this case, Democratic senators such as Schumer, Leahy, and Klobuchar 
served as advocates for Sotomayor, emphasizing her legal record and judiciousness (U.S. 
Senate 2009, 24, 128-132, 360, 420). Conversely, Republican senators such as Sessions, 
Kyl, and Grassley use their time to demonstrate that she is biased or could be prejudiced 
in her rulings if confirmed (U.S. Senate 2009, 6-7, 16-17, 21-23).  
Judicial nominations do not operate in a vacuum. The public is made aware of the 
nominee after the president makes his selection months before the confirmation hearing. 
Americans get their information regarding candidates through elites, such as the media 
and interest groups. Opponents to the nominee will attempt to frame the debate to 
emphasize political controversies in order to derail the confirmation (Gibson and Caldeira 
2009, 142). This appears to have worked in the case of Sotomayor. Senator Klobuchar 
relays a story in which she was in the airport prior to the nomination hearings, when an 
airport worker and constituent from her home state asked “are you going to vote for that 
woman?” The worker explained to the senator their concern that Sotomayor would let her 
“emotions get in front of the law” (U.S. Senate 2009, 36). 
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This exchange captures the debate of Sotomayor’s concern for empathy in 
deciding cases. Through the nomination hearings, senators raised objections to the judge 
due to the fact that she might allow her feelings and emotions color her judgment in 
deciding cases. This plays within the reason versus desire binarism (Burgess 1999, 208) 
and in this instance links directly to the binarism of judicial restraint versus activism. The 
discussion illuminates the asymmetrical power relationship between the dichotomous 
pairings. Judicial restraint and reason are seen as the preferred approaches to the law, and 
the focus on Sotomayor’s empathy allows for skepticism in her capabilities as a judge: 
she might use activism and her desire to further her preferences in regards to the law.  
The fact that a constituent asked a senator if she would vote for “that woman” 
demonstrates the effectiveness elites had in framing the debate regarding Sotomayor’s 
nomination prior to the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Newspapers 
reported on what were argued to be controversial aspects of Sotomayor’s past (Markon 
2009). This allowed for senators to capitalize on questions of her judicial temperament 
and capacity for allowing emotions into consideration in her rulings. President Obama, 
when nominating Sotomayor, said "depth and breadth of one's empathy" and "their 
broader vision of what America should be” was critical for judges (U.S. Senate 2009, 6). 
Senator Sessions, during the hearings, said “call it empathy, call it prejudice, or call it 
sympathy, but whatever it is, it is not law” (U.S. Senate 2009, 7).  
These words were all spoken by persons other than Sotomayor. Again, despite her 
lengthy resume and years of service as a judge, those that were opposed to her were able 
to frame the debate by raising questions and drawing suspicion of her record. The word 
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“empathy” served as a trigger, evoking disdain for anyone who would refute reason in 
favor of desire. In this framework, the two are diametrically opposed. The question of her 
ability to rule fairly as a judge was so suspect that it gave rise to the term “empathy 
standard” in regards to the possibility that she would consider emotions (U.S. Senate 209, 
6, 40).  
By making the word empathy something worthy of derision and suspicion, 
Sotomayor’s opponents were able to couple it with doubts over her ability to rule with 
restraint. If she is willing to consider identity and heritage, as her Wise Latina comments 
show, if she is willing to give consideration to the positions of others and has empathy for 
those that come before her, then she will be willing to go beyond what is demanded by 
the law and the Constitution and rule in favor of her unreasoned preferences. She will be 
an activist, giving consideration to standards outside of the heteropatriarchal norms.  
The effectiveness of framing the nomination within these binarisms, restraint 
versus activism and reason versus desire, put Sotomayor and her supporters on the 
defensive. Sotomayor herself spent time, when talking about rulings she delivered in 
prior cases, to note that despite where her sympathies lied, she followed what was 
demanded by the law in delivering her rulings (U.S. Senate 2009, 72). Senator Klobuchar 
went through a painstaking process to detail rulings made by Sotomayor in which the 
average person would have sympathy for one side, but in which case the judge rules in 
favor of the other in accordance with the law (U.S. Senate 2009, 127-128). 
The fact that the constituent referred to Sotomayor as “that woman” in a 
conversation with a woman senator, Klobuchar, shows that the framing of Sotomayor as 
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an activist, empathetic Other was effective, to the point that a senator felt the need to use 
her time before the committee to publicly acknowledge and refute the constituent’s 
concern. Sotomayor is unlike Klobuchar and other women, who are normal, reasoned, 
principled, restrained. Sotomayor, as “that woman,” is a threat to the established order. It 
reveals the asymmetrical power balance that is given to the framework of the debate 
when it is confined to binarisms. Judicial restraint and solid, reasoned judicial decisions 
are the preferred path and anything Other than that is detrimental.  
Using metaphors to reinforce binarisms 
 Aside from being replete with baseball analogies, which is a traditionally 
American and male dominated sport, the nomination hearings provided ample 
opportunity for other metaphors to manifest themselves. They served a useful purpose 
within the context of the nomination hearings to explain the position of Sotomayor as a 
judge within American society. For example, Senator Sessions, a Republican from 
Alabama, explained that without the limit of being “restrained by precedent and the threat 
of reversal from higher courts,” Judge Sotomayor’s judicial philosophy, and by extension 
her latent activism, will be “allowed to reach full bloom” (U.S. Senate 2009, 7). Either 
this suggests that Sotomayor’s full capacity as a judge is thus far restrained and will be 
able to grow into activism should she be confirmed to the Supreme Court, or it indicates a 
level of disingenuousness in her capacity as a judge. It suggests that as a judge she is not 
ruling in accordance with mainstream understandings of the law, but is instead playing a 
role in order to serve her own agenda. In this instance, that agenda is to be confirmed to 
the highest court in order to become unrestrained and thus unchained by things such as 
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precedent and the threat of reversal from higher courts. In either case, the use of such a 
language device does not comport with Sotomayor’s history as a judge for 17 years (U.S. 
Senate 2009, 123). 
Metaphors are devices used to attribute a characteristic from one thing onto 
something else (Hegstrom and McCarl-Nielsen 2002, 220). But more importantly, 
metaphors serve as symbolic shortcuts. They serve the purpose of attributing deeper 
meaning to a subject indirectly. It allows the speaker to address the subject without 
directly confronting a particular aspect of that person. It is therefore able to accomplish 
the description of a thing using few words that otherwise would take a list of 
characteristics. It is in this capacity that we find the ability of Session’s blooming 
metaphor to transmit larger meaning (Hegstrom and McCarl-Nielsen 2002, 223). A 
flower is used to describe a woman, which is common in American culture. It associates 
her with fragility, nature, beauty, softness, and delicateness (Hegstrom and McCarl-
Nielsen 2002, 228). This reinforces a common double-standard, in which men are seen as 
rough and strong and women are soft and delicate. Men are hard-working and provide, 
while women are nurturing and take care of the home (Valenti 2008, 22-25).  
Using a metaphor can also invoke stereotypes without their explicit mention. As 
Banaji and Hardin (1996) found, stereotypes can be invoked without explicit reference, 
with certain words or combinations of words used to serve as code for implicit gender 
roles. For example, certain occupations are explicitly gendered, like a fireman or 
waitress, but there are also implicitly gendered occupations, such as doctor and nurse. 
This is important because judgments are made based on gender roles automatically 
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without explicitly acknowledging the gender. The English language is replete with 
gendered words and phrases, but this can be implicit as well as explicit (Banaji and 
Hardin 1996, 136, 141). So again, by utilizing the flower metaphor, the listener can be 
reminded about the implicit gender role of a judge, which is a position most commonly 
held by men. 
It is in such comments that the underlying heterosexist conceptions of our 
governmental institutions are revealed. Language that appeals to the senses by using 
metaphors and invoking imagery associated with modesty, reproduction, growth, and 
sexuality, such as the idea of clothing nakedness and covering that which might offend, 
as well as comparing Judge Sotomayor to a flower not fully in bloom. Referencing a 
flower not fully bloomed is an unnecessary appeal to emphasize Sotomayor’s gender, 
while using sexualized imagery to suggest that she might not be fully developed in her 
judicial philosophy or feign judicial modesty in a subversive attempt to obtain a higher 
position in government. By using such an appeal, the speaker is able to undermine the 
judge’s credibility, despite nearly two decades of experience, in order to question her 
motivations and highlight the risk associated with appointed a justice that is a woman by 
linking her with judicial activism (U.S. Senate 2009, 16).  
By repeatedly mentioning the Wise Latina remarks (U.S. Senate 2009, 123), 
Republican senators effectively structured their argument against Sotomayor within the 
constraints of the judicial restraint/judicial activism and reason/desire binarisms. They 
highlight comments that suggest she might be an activist on the Supreme Court and has 
previously signaled a willingness to take into consideration identity as an influence in 
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decision-making (U.S. Senate 2009, 425, 493). Such criticisms of Sotomayor’s speech on 
the part of senators on the committee forced her to backtrack and apologize, calling the 
remarks a “rhetorical flourish that fell flat” (U.S. Senate 2009, 73). Advocates for her 
nomination on the committee came to her defense. Senator Durbin noted the context 
within which she spoke them. Senator Klobuchar mentioned that she made the 
controversial comments before her confirmation by the committee when nominated to the 
lower court and they went unnoticed or were not criticized back then. Senator Specter 
stated that people were making a “mountain out of a molehill” and noted the reference of 
other prior nominees to their life experience and background (U.S. Senate 2009, 144, 
357, 373).  
Judicial restraint/judicial activism 
 Democratic Senator Feingold tells viewers at the beginning of Sotomayor’s 
nomination hearing to be wary of the term “activist,” as it often denotes a "a judge who 
decides a case in a way you don't like" (U.S. Senate 2009, 20). Senator Franken tells 
Sotomayor that he is concerned that “activism is on the rise,” but he also states that he 
agrees with Feingold’s definition, that often people use the term to describe a judge that 
rules in ways they do not like (U.S. Senate 2009, 53). Republican Senator Cornyn uses a 
different definition of activism in which he says it can be a good thing, "if it is enforcing 
the rights and the laws that have been passed by the legislative branch," but that it is a 
bad thing if it involves "inventing new rights" and "veering off this course of enforcing a 
written text" (U.S. Senate 2009, 33). This reinforces Gibson and Caldeira’s (2009) 
position that charges of judicial activism can complicate and obscure debates regarding a 
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nominee’s judicial qualifications, the following of stare decisis, and arguments based on 
policy and political ideology (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 143). 
 While Democratic senators might be assuaged to know, as Senator Sessions tells 
Franken, that there can be conservative activists as well as liberal, it is the Republican 
senators that go on the assault against activism, which they appear to place on liberal 
judges (U.S. Senate 2009, 6). The Republican senators spend a significant amount of 
their time deriding activism and the judicial decisions made by activists in the judicial 
branch (U.S. Senate 2009, 22, 26-27, 33-34, 407, 425, 454). Democratic senators also 
subscribe to this framework of the debate, by ceding territory within the debate in 
emphasizing Sotomayor’s judicial temperament and her modesty (U.S. Senate 2009, 14 
24, 54-55, 77, 94, 127). 
 Sotomayor herself rejects the debate within the framework of activism versus 
restraint and instead characterizes constitutional questions and arguments regarding the 
law as having "no objective stance but only a series of perspectives. No neutrality, no 
escape from choice in judging" (U.S. Senate 2009, 122). However, Sotomayor’s position 
does not have to be acknowledged by the committee itself, which adheres to a view that 
places judging solely within the confines of a dichotomous relationship, between judicial 
restraint and activism.  
The Nomination of Elena Kagan to the United States Supreme Court 
 Elena Kagan was nominated to be the fourth woman to serve on the United States 
Supreme Court in 2010 by President Obama. It marked President Obama's second 
nomination to the Court. She was selected to replace retiring liberal justice John Paul 
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Stevens. Although she had no prior judicial experience, Kagan was dean of Harvard Law 
School and later the solicitor general for the United States (Baker 2010). 
 Not having prior judicial experience, but extensive academic experience in the 
area of the law, Kagan’s nomination hearing focused on prominent issues within her 
tenure as dean at Harvard Law School. Primarily, emphasis was placed on her role as 
dean when military recruiters were prohibited from using the law schools facilities due to 
a conflict between the institution’s non-discrimination policy and the military’s Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell policy, which barred lesbians and gays from serving openly (Baker 2010). 
Republican senators pounced on this issue as an opportunity to show that Kagan did not 
adhere to the rule of law (Kagan 2010, Day 2, 60:00).  
 This issue area appeals directly to the binarisms identified by Burgess, such as 
heterosexuality versus homosexuality and judicial restraint versus activism. Calls for 
investigation into Kagan’s sexuality began on May 11, 2010, when the Wall Street 
Journal published an old photograph of Kagan playing softball on the front page of the 
paper (Appendix B). Although they did not explicit mention Kagan’s sexuality, other 
national newspapers capitalized on the appearance of the photo in the Wall Street Journal 
to initiate a debate regarding sexuality and the persistence of stereotypes (Fermino 2010).  
 The publication of the photo played upon assumptions and widely held 
stereotypes regarding the definition and appearance stereotypically associated with 
lesbians. By using a picture of Kagan playing softball, a women’s sport that is also 
traditionally popular among lesbians, the Wall Street Journal was able to invoke a 
reaction. Other newspapers used it to begin debates regarding Kagan’s sexuality as well 
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(Fermino 2010; Washington 2010). Most of these played upon suspicion of violation of 
heterosexual norms. Besides Kagan’s appearance, a softball player with short hair, she 
was also a successful professional with an academic career, middle-aged, unmarried, and 
without children (Washington 2010). It should be questioned as to why the appearance of 
a woman and how she compares to the appearance of other women has anything to do 
with her qualifications to hold a position within government, not to mention that is it the 
highly salient and respectable position of Supreme Court justice (King 1991, 3). 
 These characteristics played well together to allow Kagan to be criticized as a 
nominee in much the same way as Sotomayor. The characteristics of her as a nominee 
violated the traditional sexist interpretations regarding the role of women: that they marry 
a man and have children, instead of remaining single and pursuing a career (Burgess 
1999, 203-204). The photograph of Kagan playing softball added another element to 
draw suspicion: that she might be homosexual. These factors placed her firmly within the 
outgroups established by normative constraints on governmental and social institutions. It 
also signifies a double standard, in which a woman’s relationship status is deemed a valid 
point of discussion and pertinent in assessing her for a public position. The same scrutiny 
would not be afforded an unmarried male counterpart (Marcus 2010). While Roberts’ 
sexuality was discussed implicitly in the national media, it did not appear to gain traction 
(Scott 2005; Appendix C). A single, career professional woman without children was a 
threat to the order established in which men, the patriarchal heads of the family unit, are 
seen as the dominant authority figure (Butler 1990, 3, 39). 
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 In the context of these articles published in the national media, the nomination 
hearing for Kagan before the Senate Judiciary Committee is seen in a different light. 
While the senators do not explicitly acknowledge the photograph or question her 
sexuality, her opponents focus on issues which draw attention to her Otherness and as 
being a member of those outgroups in the dichotomous pairings: a woman, a judicial 
activist, and a homosexual or one that sympathizes with homosexuals. All of these, in 
combination, threaten the pre-established heteropatriarchal order (Burgess 1999, 204; 
LeMoncheck 1997, 38).  
Using words to reinforce binarisms 
 Given that Kagan does not have the prior judicial experience like Sotomayor, 
senators had to review her written works, career history, and use their time during the 
hearings to investigate her judicial philosophy and temperament (Washington 2010). This 
appeared to be a problem for some of the senators, given that many of them lapsed in 
giving her deference in her position as dean of Harvard Law and Solicitor General of the 
United States. While Democratic Senators were consistent in referring to her as Dean or 
General Kagan, Republicans frequently referred to her as Miss Kagan, although not in 
every single instance (Kagan 2010). 
 While this in itself does not constitute sexualized language used to reinforce a 
Queer New Institutionalist approach to constitutional theory, it does contribute to the 
heterosexist conceptions of individuals. Men are given deference as they are usually 
called mister or assigned titles, such as senator, president, judge, etc. These are 
indications of accomplishment. Conversely, women are assigned titles based on their 
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relationships to men (King 1991, 3, 46). By referring to her as Miss Kagan instead of 
General or Dean Kagan, it puts one more small emphasis on her position as a member of 
multiple outgroups and raises suspicions regarding her capacity to carry out her duties 
should she be confirmed as a justice (Crenshaw 2000). It continually reminds listeners 
that Kagan is single and has not conformed normatively by marrying a man and taking 
his last name.  
Using metaphors to reinforce binarisms 
Like during Sotomayor’s nomination hearing, a number of metaphors were 
employed during Kagan’s nomination hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
Held in the summer of 2010, senators on the committee took turns to investigate Kagan’s 
record to determine her fitness to serve on the highest court in the land. It marks an event 
in which the senators, as well as Americans, are able to get to know the president’s 
nominee to the Supreme Court.  
On the first day of the hearings, Republican Senator Sessions asks Kagan if, given 
her lack of experience, she is able to remain within the “harness of the law” (Kagan 2010, 
Day 1, 27:00). This, once again, is an appeal to the dichotomous relationship between 
restraint and activism in approaching constitutional theory. Sessions uses a simple 
metaphor to inquire as to Kagan’s fidelity and adherence to the law, a refutation of 
judicial activism, and operations within the confines he expects of a nominee to the 
Supreme Court. It is misleading to the inquiry as to Kagan’s judicial philosophy because 
it subscribes to an objective reading of the Constitution, one which does not exist. 
Justices are not democratically elected and are instead appointed by the President. They 
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are removed from the electorate and are therefore given no direct mandate from the 
country’s citizens (Burgess 1999, 205; U.S. Senate 2009, 463; Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 
142). 
Sessions’ metaphor again evokes a contrast between the heterosexist norm that is 
preferred and the candidate presented before the committee: Kagan. As a single woman, 
focused on her career, she is not conforming to the expected role attributed to women in 
our society. As an individual outside the confines of the patriarchal family, she is thus 
marginalized (Burgess 1999, 204). Also, as not having a prior role as a judge, senators 
have to rely on her professional writings and career as an academic and solicitor general 
in order to assess her judiciousness and political ideology (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 
140). By asking how Kagan would operate within the confines, or the “harness,” of the 
law, the senator subscribed to stereotypes and assumptions argued by a Queer New 
Institutionalist approach. He could have asked what reason he had to believe that Kagan 
would not operate within the confines of the law, instead of the opposite. 
Other metaphors were utilized by opponents during Kagan’s nomination hearing. 
On the last day of the hearings before the committee, witnesses were called to present 
their support or opposition to the nominee publicly before the committee. The 
individuals, many of whom represent interest groups and political organizations, submit 
their comments for the records and also answer questions posed by the senators on the 
committee. Compared to the opinions expressed by the senators regarding the nominee, 
the statements made by witnesses before the committee are much more aggressive, 
pointed, and politically adversarial (Kagan 2010, Day 4). 
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One such witness for the minority Republicans on the committee was Robert Alt 
from the Heritage Foundation. In his comments before the committee, he assailed Kagan. 
Alt speaks out against liberal activism, which he distinguishes from conservative 
activism. He argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United case was 
activism which overturned precedent, but which returned to an even older precedent. This 
is opposed to the Court's decision in Austin v. Chamber of Commerce. In his 
characterization, that was an instance of liberal activism in which the Court embraced 
speech equalization theory which ignored precedent in a way incomparable to the 
Citizens United ruling (Kagan 2010, Day 4, 130:00).  
While Alt's testimony is a more general critique of activism in general, 
specifically liberal activism, he links it in the end to the nomination of Kagan, who he 
suggests would be another member of the liberal wing of the Court, ready to overturn 
historic precedent. No such instances of explicit sexualized language were used by 
witnesses testifying against Sotomayor (U.S. Senate 2009). By utilizing sexualized 
language, he is able to manipulate imagery that is threatening to the average human 
being. An “orphaned eunuch,” as he describes the legislation after the ruling from a 
liberal activist court, is one which cannot reproduce and lacks the capability to fend for 
itself (Kagan 2010, Day 4, 130:00). Without parents, an orphan is alone in the world and 
vulnerable. The imagery of a eunuch suggests castration, which is a threat to the 
reestablished conception of society, where the patriarchal family is the basic unit. The 
assumed dominance of men is thus threatened by such an activist Court. With its liberal 
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agenda, it can lash out at that which it sees as detrimental to society and remove its ability 
to reproduce, thereby rendering it useless and invalid.  
Judicial restraint/judicial activism 
 The focus on the issue of the military’s Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (DADT) and 
additional questions on the possible legal future for the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), demonstrate further attempts to frame the debate within the confines of 
heterosexual versus homosexual and judicial restraint versus judicial activism 
dichotomies. By focusing on issues that deal with homosexuality, senators are able to 
indirectly remind Americans about the questions previously raised regarding the 
speculation about Kagan’s sexuality while also dealing with possible upcoming issues 
(Kagan 2010, Day 3, 168:00, 336:00, 394:00). These issues are ones that are able to fit 
well within the confines of the debate between activism and restraint. Since public 
opinion on questions regarding homosexuality continue to evolve, and it is probable that 
at least one of them will come before the Court, they serve as the perfect area of focus for 
opponents. If Kagan has already been the subject of suspicion raised in national 
newspapers over her sexuality, then attempts to characterize her as a judicial activist in 
regards to issues of homosexuality could prove beneficial to her opponents.  
 Such charges of activism again provoke her defenders, Democrats on the 
committee, to come to her aid. Senator Schumer notes also that she is “judicially modest” 
(Kagan 2010, Day 2, 439:00). Kagan herself talks about having restraint and humility 
during the hearing. Senator Kyl asks Kagan if she can be a neutral arbiter, which again 
suggests that he has reason to believe that so far she is not or has not been neutral in her 
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approach to the law (Kagan 2010, Day 1, 82:30). Senator Graham asks if her “activism 
can be parked” (Kagan 2010, Day 1, 99:20). While he may be referring to her role as the 
“advocate” for the government’s position as the solicitor general, it might also suggest 
that he does not necessarily expect her to be restrained. This is directly within the 
confines of the restraint versus activism debate. Multiple senators cast doubts over 
Kagan’s ability to adhere to the Constitution and the law by characterizing her as 
unrestrained, unable to approach the law in an unbiased fashion. So from a position in 
which she came into the hearings under suspicious and scrutiny of the public eye for her 
identity or what her identity was expected to be, Kagan continued to be criticized and 
judged harshly as one who would violate the constraints of the system; she would reject 
restraint in judging and instead work as an activist. 
The debates during Kagan’s nomination hearing are therefore place firmly within 
the theoretical confines of the judicial restraint versus activism binarism. Even Kagan 
allows this construction of the debate regarding constitutional theory to be maintained. At 
one point during the hearing, Democratic Senator Whitehouse mentions the rise in 5-4 
decisions on the Supreme Court. He cites this as evidence that the Court is divided and 
that judges follow their own personal policy preferences. He is refuted by Kagan herself. 
She explains that it means justices have honest disagreements about the law and that it is 
not indicative of personal preferences being followed. (Kagan 2010, Day 3, 32:00).  
Perhaps it is easier for Kagan to refute Whitehouse than acknowledge an 
argument outside the simple constraints of the restraint versus activism dichotomous 
pairing. She does not have a judicial record, not having previously served as a judge, and 
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therefore can refute suggestions that she is an activist as there is no prior proof. Instead of 
having to defend an alternate conception of constitutional theory or how the justices on 
the Supreme Court reach their decisions, she can deflect criticism by using her own 
record and history to refute criticism within the confines of the restraint versus activism 
frame, even if it is flawed in practice (Burgess 1999, 204-205). 
 The confirmation hearings for Sotomayor and Kagan to the Supreme Court during 
the 111th Congress focused on controversial issues from their past. Sotomayor was 
charged with being an activist, as charged by Senators citing her Wise Latina comments 
and ruling in the Ricci case. This helped reinforce male/female, white/non-white, 
reason/desire, and judicial restraint/judicial activism binarisms in attempts to raise 
suspicions and associate her with the marginalized Other. Kagan faced questions from 
opponents regarding her history as Dean of Harvard Law and policies implemented to 
challenge Don’t Ask Don’t Tell and the Solomon Amendment. This appeals to the 
constraints imposed by male/female, reason/desire, heterosexual/homosexual, and 
judicial restraint/judicial activism binarisms. It too was used to cast doubt on the nominee 
as to her judicial fitness to represent preconceived norms regarding society and 
governmental institutions. Specifically, questions were raised about the fitness of the 
nominees to conform to the expected heteropatriarchal standards necessary to serve as 
Supreme Court justices (U.S. Senate 2009; Kagan 2010; Sedgwick 10-11; Burgess 1999, 
207-217).  
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4. Results and discussion 
Results 
 There is no doubt that Supreme Court nomination hearings are partisan affairs. 
Congress is a political body, and the nominees are selected by the president, and therefore 
it is to be expected that Republican presidents are likely to nominate conservative judges 
to the Court and Democratic presidents are likely to nominate liberal justices. After 
reviewing the nomination hearings of the four most recently appointed Supreme Court 
justices, the pattern established by Gibson and Caldiera (2009). According to the authors, 
nominees are examined to see if they have the professional qualifications to serve on the 
highest court in the land. Their records and judicial temperament is also probed to 
determine if it falls within the mainstream of American politics (140, 143).  
 Gibson and Caldiera found that during Alito’s nomination hearing, the nominee 
focused on his judicial qualifications and downplayed political issues in order to secure 
confirmation (144). This was also true of Roberts, Sotomayor, and Kagan. As they 
explain, charges of “judicial activism” can complicate the proceedings, and this was true 
of the nominees before the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 109th and 111th 
Congresses. While all four of the nominees receiving confirmation from the entire 
Senate, this was not without having to endure criticism and inflation of possible 
controversies (Gibson and Caldiera 139, 141; Savage 2009; Baker 2010).  
What happens in the nomination hearings does not occur within a vacuum. The 
senators submit for the record editorials from prominent newspapers during the hearings. 
This suggests that they are receptive to the commentary circulating on the Hill as the 
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nomination proceeds. Thus, one must be alert to these narratives that might arise in the 
outside media, as they may produce an indirect influence on the hearings themselves. 
Senators may be prompted by revelations in the media to initiate a line of questioning 
that, observed in isolation, could be taken at face value and not extend to a secondary 
meaning that referenced the outside sources pressuring particular committee members to 
pursue certain inquiries. 
Double standards 
 Roberts and Alito, two married white men, were appointed by a Republican 
president and confirmed by a Republican Senate. Conversely, Sotomayor and Kagan, a 
Hispanic woman and a white woman, both single, were appointed by a Democratic 
president and confirmed by a Democratic Senate. Applying the theory of Queer New 
Institutionalism allows for a critical examination of the implications and effects of 
reinforcing binarisms. Dichotomous pairings represent asymmetrical power balances that 
are inherently unstable (Sedgwick 1990, 10; Burgess 1999, 200-201). If the prescription 
of Queer New Institutionalism is to be proven correct, then the reinforcement of 
binarisms will occur regardless of the political leanings of the individuals involved. 
Republican senators utilize them in the nomination hearings of conservative nominees to 
the Court, just as likely as Democratic senators use them in the nomination hearings of 
liberal nominees. This has been demonstrated in an analysis of the nomination hearings 
for Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The maintenance of binarisms occurred 
regardless of party identification of the senators on the committee or the nominee before 
them.  
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The implications for the nominees were quite different when comparing those of 
the 109th Congress, Roberts and Alito, and those of the 111th Congress, Sotomayor and 
Kagan. Conspicuously absent from the nomination hearings of Roberts or Alito are any 
mention of the potential that their judicial philosophies could be allowed to “bloom” if 
appointed to the Supreme Court. There is no mention of “orphaned eunuchs” (U.S. 
Senate 2005; U.S. Senate 2006). And although the New York Times implied it, no 
significant tests of Roberts’ sexual orientation migrated to the nomination hearing itself 
(Scott 2005). However, questions about Kagan’s sexuality and the subsequent focus on 
issues relevant to LGBT equality were central controversies during her confirmation 
hearings (Appendices B, C). 
Questions regarding Roberts’ sexuality were in the form of a photograph 
published in the New York Times, coupled with the comparison of his association with 
conservatives at Harvard with queers as marginalized Others, apparently never gained 
traction. This is probably due to the fact that he is married and his wife and kids were 
present during his confirmation hearing (U.S. Senate 2005, 1). This reinforces 
Sedgwick’s point in realizing that the binary pairs allow for the creation of identity and 
not just action. It does not matter who Roberts is attracted to and what sex he engages in, 
because he conforms to (most) heteropreferential ideals. He is married (even though it 
occurred later in life) and he has children (even though they were adopted). However, the 
suspicion associated with Kagan’s nomination and her potential to be a lesbian was more 
blatant and enduring. After a photo of her playing softball was published in the Wall 
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Street Journal (Appendix B), other major newspapers ran with the theme in more explicit 
terms.  
The New York Post reran the picture with the headline, “Does this photo suggest 
high court nominee Elena Kagan is a lesbian?” (Fermino 2010). It does not matter what 
the content of the article said after that leading condemnation. The closet door is thus 
opened, and regardless as to whether or not Kagan is in there, the suspicion remains. The 
Chicago Sun Times was more accurate with its headline, “Stereotypes spur question on 
Kagan” (Washington 2010). Still, it is unfair to pose such a question for a number of 
reasons. 
Rumors, gossip, and suggestive innuendo regarding the sexual orientation of 
Supreme Court nominees proved to be a sexist endeavor, showing preferential treatment 
to heterosexual norms. While these questions of sexuality were raised in regards to Kagan 
and Roberts, they did not persist in the same ways. Roberts was a married man with 
children, therefore suspicion that he was gay subsided. This is despite photographic 
evidence of him holding a pie in the 1980s. However, since Kagan is a single woman in 
her 50s, a photograph of her enjoying softball in the 1990s allows questions of her 
sexuality to persist (Scott 2005; Fermino 2010). It is a persistent suspicion that continues 
to present day. Google searches for the names of each of the nominees reveal the top 
searches for Kagan to include “Elena Kagan gay” and “Elena Kagan husband.” The same 
is not true for the single Justice Sotomayor, who is of a similar age, and Chief Justice 
Roberts, whose sexuality was questioned as well, or for the married Justice Alito 
(Appendix C).  
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An unfair assumption based on stereotypes regarding Kagan’s sexuality is also 
suggestive of other factors predicted by Queer New Institutionalism, as demonstrated in 
the discourse analysis during her nomination hearing. If she is an unmarried woman who 
has focuses and been successful in her career, and if she enjoys softball, she must be a 
lesbian. If she is a lesbian and was appointed by Democratic president, she must be 
politically liberal and therefore a judicial activist. If she is a judicial activist and if Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell policy was an issue during her tenure as Dean at Harvard Law, she will 
rule based on her personal policy preferences which means a bias towards people like her 
(read: homosexuals). If she is biased towards her personal preferences, she will legalize 
same-sex marriage, and so forth. By utilizing one photograph and running it on the front 
page of a major American newspaper, shortcut stereotypes can lead to prejudgments and 
prejudices based on heteropreferential norms (Fermino 2010, Washington 2010).  
It is through this subtle crescendo that builds over time that witnesses before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee are then justified in charging that the appointment of a 
justice just as Kagan will lead to legislation comparable to an “orphaned eunuch.” Even 
though Kagan had never been a judge, she apparently has the motivation. The only thing 
missing is her ascension to a liberal Supreme Court full of judicial activists to provide her 
with the weapon she needs to castrate legislation and threaten the stability of 
heteropatriarchal society (Kagan 2010, day 4, 1:30:00). 
While hyperbolic, it was the choice of sexualized language used by the witness, 
Robert Alt of the Heritage Foundation, to deride and hopefully derail the appointment of 
Kagan to the Supreme Court. To be fair, usage of such language resulted in scoffs and 
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smirks from the people in the committee hearing room, as is visible in the video records 
of the proceedings (Kagan 2010, day 4, 1:30:00). While colorful language in the extreme, 
it illustrates the point made by all the rumors, gossip, and innuendo evident in the 
circumlocution by some media outlets and the senators in their line of questioning. It also 
served to reinforce the binarisms identified by Queer New Institutionalism.  
Binarisms: a product of partisanship? 
By using Queer New Institutionalism as the basis to studying Supreme Court 
nominations, reinforced norms based on sexuality are identified and challenged. The 
theoretical constructs which maintain these norms, binarisms, waver and the lines drawn 
by them are blurred once under critical examination. This was demonstrated through 
Senator Brownback’s appeal in both the Roberts and Alito nomination hearings to ignore 
repeated precedent and overturn Roe v. Wade.  
The nomination hearings are replete with reference to heteronormative behavior. 
This is most notable in the continual dependence on baseball analogies. A male 
dominated sport, it is America’s pastime. The majority wants a justice that will exercise 
judicial restraint and will use neutral principles to reach objective decisions. It wants an 
umpire to call balls and strikes. It wants a reasoned, judicially restrained, straight, white, 
male. Not an umpire that will walk out onto the field and start playing the game for 
themselves. Nor does it want a queer. Or an ethnic/racial minority. Or a woman. That is 
the essence of the demands of the dichotomous pairings uncovered by a Queer New 
Instititonalist approach, if they are allowed to remain unchallenged.  
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The victims of these binarisms are the nominees themselves, as senators, 
witnesses, and the media work to constrain them within the confines of the dichotomous 
pairings. Using the association with the minoritized Other to raise suspicion in the hopes 
of derailing the nominee in favor of one more in line with their policy preferences. The 
nominees were forced, at times, to operate within the confines of the binarisms. Roberts 
appealed to neutral principles, aligning himself with the dominant sphere of judicial 
restraint in the face of the minoritized judicial activism. Alito accepted Hatch’s assertions 
at the prevalence of judicial activism, responding that justices needed to be restrained. 
Sotomayor disavowed her Wise Latina comments as a “rhetorical flourish that fell flat” 
instead of trying to justify them. Kagan agreed that judicial restraint was needed in the 
face of increasing activism. These binarisms were referenced by senators of both parties. 
In comments his comments during Sotomayor’s nomination hearing, Franken says he 
favors judicial restraint but is worried that activism is on the rise (U.S. Senate 2009, 53). 
However, not all of the nominees subscribe to these dichotomous views. Although 
Sotomayor is forced to retreat from and downplay her Wise Latina comments, senators 
also criticize her for admitting that she believes there is “no objective stance but only a 
series of perspectives.” Senator Kyl uses her position in combination with his critique of 
her Wise Latina comments to suggest she will use identity and desire, rejecting restraint 
and reason, in her decision making. To refute this, Sotomayor depends on her record as a 
judge. Despite comments that she made during various speeches, she has a judicial record 
of 17 years to defend her position that she is a judge that adequately applies the law (U.S. 
Senate 2009, 122-123).  
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While sexualized language is used to reinforce binarisms, it was also used to 
refute them, as Senator Specter did in using his term “flaming liberal” to offset the “arch 
conservative.” He used the terms in reference to Alito, suggesting that if one had an 
agenda to paint him as a judge one way or another, they would only need to be selective 
in the cases they wish to use to demonstrate it. Specter uses the contrasting pairs to 
denounce a perception of Alito that would place him resolutely in either category. By 
using this language, he is simultaneously acknowledging the persistence of the binarism, 
and also similar ones, and denouncing them as well.  
Judicial restraint/judicial activism: to the exclusion of alternative approaches 
It might be plausible to blame the nominees for allowing the dichotomous 
constraints outlined by Burgess (1999) and Sedgwick (1990) to endure. Sotomayor was 
refuted by Senator Kyl for stating that there is no objective stance to interpret the 
Constitution (U.S. Senate 2009, 122). But even when senators themselves raise the 
possibility that there is no objective stance, the nominees refute them.  
Senator Whitehouse tried to raise the point that by noting an increase in 5-4 
decisions released by the Supreme Court, mirroring the findings of Epstein and Knight 
(1998) during Kagan’s nomination hearing.  Kagan refuted his point and insisted that 
judges do not make decisions based on their personal policy preferences as the academic 
research suggests. Sotomayor and Alito both state that reasonable people can disagree 
when presented with a set of facts, even judges (U.S. Senate 2006, 332; U.S. Senate 
2009, 131).  
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The increasing lack of consensus should make a reasonable citizen suspicious of 
this explanation for the prevalence of split decisions from the Court, if only for the fact 
that academic studies which attempt to explain how the Supreme Court justices operate 
are thorough and convincing in their analysis and evidence. But the prerogative of the 
nominees and justices to ignore such studies, such as Epstein and Knight’s (1998), may 
insulate the Court and protect it from unnecessary criticism. However, this does a 
disservice to American citizens who are removed from the Supreme Court. As an 
unelected body removed from the democratic process, failure to refute the binarisms 
reinforces the status quo (Burgess 1999, 205, 214). This is the same status quo that is 
biased towards the dominant groups maintained by the previously identified dichotomous 
pairings. It is the same status quo that seeks to keep the minoritized Others out of the 
mainstream.  
As Burgess predicted, a Queer New Institutionalist perspective will reveal the 
logical inconsistencies once the theoretical binarisms are applied to the practical. This 
occurred during Sotomayor’s nomination hearing, when her responses prompted Senator 
Graham to suggest she was beginning to sound like a strict constructionist (U.S. Senate 
2009, 135). By continually reinforcing the constraints of dichotomous pairs, namely 
judicial restraint/judicial activism, the senators received responses cast in that mold. 
Graham exhibited frustration with Sotomayor’s responses, perceiving them to be much 
like what would be expected from a strict constructionist. This indicates that he perceives 
that she is not a strict constructionist in reality. Sotomayor also disavowed the 
implications of her Wise Latina comments and reluctance to further develop her prior 
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comments about the lack of an objective stance in interpreting the Constitution 
(Sotomayor 2009, 122-123). She fails to identify or develop an alternative outside the 
established binarism of judicial activism/judicial restraint. The only available options are 
for Sotomayor to respond to questions during the hearings in a way that appeals to the 
senators seeking a judicially restrained jurist, or admitting to being a judicial activist 
which would likely lead to rejection to the Court by the Senate. As predicted by Queer 
New Institutionalism, the binarism forces an “intellectual impasse” to the detriment of 
those that are served by the system, the citizens (Burgess 1999, 214). 
There is also no indication that judges are not testifying honestly when they refuse 
to openly reject the status quo that reinforces those binarisms. For example, during his 
nomination hearing, Roberts rejects academic analyses. He tells Senator Grassley that he 
believes judging in accordance with the rule of law follows a more “pragmatic” approach, 
to the detriment of academic theories, stating that their “demands and nuances… are 
dispensed with fairly quickly” (U.S. Senate 2005, 182). This is a view that has persisted 
with Roberts even after he secured confirmation as Chief Justice. In a recent interview 
with Supreme Court justices regarding legal writing, Roberts stated, “what the academy 
is doing, as far as I can tell, is largely of no use or interest to people who actually practice 
law” (Liptak 2011). For Chief Justice Roberts, at the very least, there is no need to stop 
operating from the confines of the judicial restraint/judicial activism binarism, as he 
remains a part of the dominant spheres identified by binarisms.  
Implications for women and minorities 
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Times have changed, and the status quo has evolved. Women do not have to act 
within the constraints of outdated norms, as evidenced by the increase in female attorneys 
and female judges and justices in the federal judiciary (U.S. Senate 2009, 561). The 
persistence of binarisms, as identified by Queer New Institutionalism, shows that there 
are invisible influences which attempt to impose the default assumptions and dominance 
associated with certain groups, at the expense of outgroups. This was acknowledged 
through the analysis of various behaviors throughout the nomination hearings. 
Although it is a horrible insult to women to imply their inferiority for a variety of 
reasons, accepting the format and structure of the nomination hearings as is does nothing 
to refute the constraints of women as being members of a marginalized outgroup. 
However, it could be argued that it serves women and associated outgroups to tolerate the 
power structures at work within the nomination hearings, because if they are confirmed, 
members of such outgroups will have attained a position where they can do more relative 
good as compared to the relative injustice done by reinforcing stereotypes and 
assumptions directed to the nominees through questioning. But, this would confirm the 
suspicions of members of the committee, who speculate that nominees answer questions 
in accordance with the expectations of the committee, merely to obtain confirmation. 
Evidence of this would then confirm to those that support the confining binarisms to 
continue to employ them to constrain normative behaviors.  
Many of the actors involved in the hearing process signaled a frustration with the 
disingenuous nature of the proceedings: they do not seem to reflect reality outside the 
Hart office building where the hearings are held. Several senators, such as Schumer and 
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Graham made comments during the hearings signaling their frustration with questions 
going unanswered and nominees being vague, hedging, and obscuring their actual 
political opinions on several issues (U.S. Senate 2005, 375; U.S. Senate 2006, 38; U.S. 
Senate 2009, 135-136). 
Conclusion 
 Approaching Supreme Court nomination hearings from a Queer New 
Institutionalist perspective provides the opportunity to look at such events through a lense 
that does not take underlying themes of sexuality and desire for granted. These themes 
serve as the basis for our society and institutions (Burgess 1999, 200). By locating and 
deconstructing the binarisms identified by queer theory, the theoretical constraints they 
reinforce can then be applied in practical terms. They reflect an untenable power 
imbalance, in which dominant ingroups rely on subordinate outgroups to maintain order. 
This power asymmetry is unstable and bound to collapse. This is because of the 
inevitability of individuals who will arise that are unable to be categorized and confined 
by the preestablished binary pairs. The marginalized Other cannot be removed, and the 
dominant spheres rely upon such individuals for their survival. For example, without the 
homosexual there is no heterosexual identity. It is entirely dependent upon the existence 
of the marginalized homosexual identity (Sedgwick 1990, 10; Butler 1990, 39).  
When viewed in the pragmatic political forum of Supreme Court nomination 
hearings, these dichotomous pairings fail, such as judicial restraint/judicial activism, 
male/female, white/black, heterosexual/homosexual, democratic authority/individual 
rights, reason/desire, etc (Burgess 1999, 204, 208, 217). Utilizing discourse analysis, the 
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four most recent nomination hearings for Supreme Court justices were deconstructed to 
identify the use of such constraints to reinforce preferred heteropatriarchal norms. The 
identified dichotomous pairings reflect a default preference for dominant spheres of 
influence. This acceptance of the mainstream position of the dominant spheres as 
ingroups is challenged when under close examination.  
The Supreme Court nomination hearings studied provided prime examples of how 
the maintenance of heteropreferential norms proves unworkable. While appealing for 
adherence to judicial restraint, senators needed to rely on the existence of judicial 
activists in order to maintain the dichotomous relationship between the two. In the 
apparent absence of such a marginalized Other, such as during the confirmation hearing 
of Judge Alito, proponents were left without a focus and were thus forced to skirt the line 
between the binarism. Republican senators, such as Brownback, who had previously 
appealed and reinforced judicial restraint, were suddenly emotionally appealing for their 
desire for an activist judge to enact his personal policy preference and overturn precedent 
in overruling Roe v. Wade (U.S. Senate 2006, 462-464).  
These binarisms fail to predict in the face of marginalized Others, who will 
always arise (Butler 1990, 39), whether it is in the form of a white, male, conservative 
senator expressing his desire to enact his personal policy preferences, or a single, female, 
Supreme Court justice that fails to define herself within the construct of judicial 
restraint/judicial activism. The failure of such binarisms to persist in practical terms 
means that, in reference to the Supreme Court, senators will need to find new ways in 
which to investigate the judicial temperament of nominees.  
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But the persistent reinforcement of these norms may cause inaction just as much 
as action. The president must choose a nominee that will pass confirmation by the Senate. 
Further exploration into the decision-making of the executive would add strength to the 
theory. If the president considers, but is reluctant, to nominate a justice who can 
overwhelmingly be framed as a marginalized Other within the context of identified 
binary pairings, Senators will be successful in continuing to frame the debate in such a 
manner. It would prevent nominees that raise suspicions as not conforming to normative 
expectations from ever being considered.  
By looking beyond the identities of potential nominees, assumptions based on 
appearances and superficial appeals to heteropatriarchal norms can be rejected in search 
of their perspective regarding the Constitution. As an unelected, undemocratic body, the 
Supreme Court rules over constitutional issues that affect all Americans (Burgess 1999, 
205). It is the Senate’s duty to “advise and consent” in order to determine the judicial 
philosophy and fitness of the president’s nominees (U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2). By 
rejecting the constraints of established binarisms, the Senate can move closer to a critical 
examination of nominees that is more satisfactory, accountable to the electorate, and 
intellectually honest. 
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